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Abstract
The Road Less Traveled: Economic Analysis of Roads and Highways
by Margaret Bock
Roads are an integral component of civilization, connecting people, markets, and ideas. In different
settings and geographies, roads can take on many different purposes. In rural, more isolated areas,
roads can serve as a cost-saving benefit and can be used as tools to increase accessibility. In urban,
more congested areas, roads can be seen as an externality-producing hindrance. Naturally, given
this view, the overall analysis of roads should reflect these different settings. To date, however, the
study of roads in the economics literature has surprisingly large pitfalls, notably in terms of topics
of study and methodologies used.
Spending on roads is a non-negligible portion of government budgets across the country, mak-
ing this topic relevant to study to make informed policy suggestions. This dissertation research,
titled The Road Less Traveled: Economic Analysis of Roads and Highways, analyzes one overar-
ching theme using three different perspectives: urban, political economy, and regional.
Chapter 1 examines the impact of high occupancy vehicle lanes (HOV) on commuting times.
The effects of HOV lanes studied from a causal perspective have been minimal in the economics
literature. Knowing the impacts of these types of infrastructure projects is beneficial in terms of
public policy and resource allocation. Using an instrumental variable (IV) approach to overcome
the endogeneity problems associated with HOV lane location selection, this study aims to uncover
the impacts of HOV lanes on commuters’ time spent going to and coming home from work in Cal-
ifornia. Making use of the 2017 National Household Travel Survey, and after data pre-processing
through coarsened exact matching (CEM), this paper finds that both having HOV lanes in work-
place counties and living closer to HOV lanes cause increased commute times to and from work
for commuters, lending credence to earlier works on road construction and traffic outcomes citing
induced demand from increased road construction (Duranton & Turner, 2011).
Chapter 2 studies the impact of mayoral election cycles impact the timing and location of
road maintenance. Political incentives affect infrastructure construction, but how incentives affect
infrastructure upkeep, like road maintenance, is sparsely documented. Previous empirical results
find different conclusions than theoretical evidence about road maintenance perceptions. Political
alignment and local election cycles are leveraged using difference-in-differences to investigate if
political incentives cause shifts in road maintenance. Robust results identify political distortions
in invasive road maintenance timing. Local election cycles, which are widespread and frequent,
shift road maintenance timing. Conservative calculations suggest local US elections cost at least
$185.5 million from 1960–2020, equivalent to 4 million meters of maintenance or maintaining all
local Pittsburgh roads ≈ 1.45 times.
Chapter 3 looks at the impact of rural roads on mortality outcomes in the Appalachian region.
Specific attention to federally funded rural roads and highways is sparse given implicit endogeneity
concerns about road placement decisions for the sake of rural development and market exposure.
This study examines the impact of the Appalachian Development Highway System (ADHS), one
of the largest and most expensive federal infrastructure projects in the United States, on mortality
outcomes in the region. IV results suggest ADHS construction significantly reduced travel-time-
sensitive mortality rates, such as heart disease and hypertension, in earlier decades of the sample.
IV results also suggest the ADHS may be associated with increased mortality rates, notably acci-
dents, in later decades of the sample. The additional cost caused by the ADHS in terms of mortality
is estimated to be $24.2 billion dollars over the length of the sample. However, benefits such as
improved travel times, employment, and income increases outweigh these costs.
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Chapter 1
The Causal Effect of High Occupancy
Vehicle Lanes on Commuting Times in
California
From correlational psychological surveys to more causal empirical econometric techniques, ex-
tensive work has been conducted to uncover the effects of the negative externalities associated
with traffic congestion. The policy response to combat congestion has varied across urban areas
throughout the world. Several places have implemented congestion pricing in city-centers or high
traffic areas to decrease the marginal benefit of traveling in the tolled area during peak travel times.
Several well-known examples include London (Leape, 2006), Stockholm (Eliasson, 2009), and the
country of Singapore (Santos, 2005). New York City recently became the first U.S. city to embrace
congestion pricing to help curb congestion.1
One of the many proposed solutions to help eliminate traffic congestion, specifically congestion




travel in an HOV lane must be carrying the minimum number of people posted at the entrance sign.
A notable characteristic of an HOV lane is that there is no charge associated with its use.2
In many urban centers across the United States, policy makers and urban planners tout the
advantages of the construction of HOV lanes; some of the benefits cited include improving highway
efficiency in terms of congestion, vehicle volumes, and emissions. In addition, many state and
federal reports cite the benefits of HOV lanes over general purpose lanes and exempt these lanes
from certain regulations that general purpose road lanes face.3 Despite the rising costs of road
construction and repair, minimal efforts have been conducted to determine whether or not HOV
lanes have been effective in reducing driving times or congestion. For example, in 2012, just 10
miles of HOV lane construction in Los Angeles county cost over $10 billion. Understanding the
mechanisms behind these special road lane policies would be beneficial to both urban planners and
commuters alike.
To attempt to analyze the effects of HOV lanes on traffic congestion, I employ an instrumental
variable technique to capture the causal effects of HOV lanes on commuting times in California.
After data pre-processing using coarsened exact matching (CEM), the vote share for Al Gore in
the 2000 presidential election is used to instrument for the location of HOV lanes in California,
as well as the distance commuters live from the nearest HOV lane. As additional robustness, the
1947 highway plan used in Baum-Snow (2007), Duranton and Turner (2011), and others is used
to instrument for the location of HOV lanes in California, as well as the distance commuters live
from the nearest HOV lane. This paper finds evidence that additional HOV lanes in commuters’
workplace counties and living near HOV lanes lead to higher commute times to and from work
and thus are not meeting the goals of policymakers. Arguably, the induced demand to drive on a
route from the construction of an HOV lane increases the commute time of all commuters who
take that route, not just the ones who take the HOV lane. This finding extends the results found
2This is in contrast with high occupancy toll (HOT) lanes, where a toll is also required in addition to the carpooling
guidelines.
3http://www.dot.ca.gov/trafficops/tm/hov.html outlines the California laws governing the pur-
pose of HOV lanes.
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in previous studies on induced demand for roadway usage by showing these results hold true even
for heterogeneous road lane types.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 1 discusses publications surrounding HOV
lanes and commuting and highlights the major trends in the literature; Section 2 details the data
sources used; Section 3 outlines methods and model specifications used to identify the causal
relationship between HOV lanes and commuting times in California; results and robustness checks
are discussed in Section 4, along with limitations of the current study design; Section 5 concludes.
1.1 Literature: Commuting and HOV Lanes
There is a large literature base that examines the impacts of traffic congestion in general. Several
psychology studies, including Hennessy and Wiesenthal (1999) note the adverse effects associated
with sitting in traffic congestion. Specifically, increased time spent in traffic congestion is asso-
ciated with increased aggressiveness. Following in this vein, the majority of the work on traffic
congestion in economics has focused on the health outcomes of those directly impacted by the
congestion.4 Currie and Walker (2011) examine the impact of pollution from E-ZPass terminals5
along interstates. This study finds that mothers who lived closer to these terminals necessarily live
along highways prone to more traffic congestion, hence more pollution in the air; these women
gave birth to children with significantly lower birth weights when compared to mothers living
near, but not as close to the E-ZPass terminals. Knittel, Miller, and Sanders (2016) also examines
the negative impacts pollution from traffic congestion has on infant health. Exploiting changes in
wind direction across highways, Deryugina, Heutel, Miller, Molitor, and Reif (2016) explores the
medical costs associated with pollution from traffic.
4There have also been several studies that try to quantify quality of life indexes taking congestion levels into
account. See Albouy and Lue (2015) for example.
5E-ZPass is an electronic toll collection system used on most tolled roads, bridges, and tunnels in the Midwestern
and Eastern United States. These electronic toll collection terminals can become quite congested during peak rush
hour times.
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Several theoretical studies have included HOV lanes to model the effect on congestion. Dahlgren
(1998) creates a model to assess the benefits of several different road layout alternatives to combat
congestion. A newer theoretical contribution to the study of HOV lanes comes from Konishi and
Mun (2010). The authors construct a model to determine when it is socially beneficial to construct
an HOV lane. The paper also examines whether converting an HOV to an HOT lane improves road
use efficiency. Again, like most other theoretical models in the realm of study, the results depend
entirely on the initial parameter values and the welfare functional form.
Duranton and Turner (2011) provide a clear starting point for any empirical research on HOV
lanes and their impact on travel times. They evaluate the effect of building additional kilometers of
roads on VKT (vehicle kilometers traveled) in the U.S. Interesting and innovative instruments are
used to overcome the endogeneity problems associated with road construction including historical
maps of highway routes, railway routes, and exploration trails in the United States. Using a com-
prehensive city-level data set, the authors find that VKT increases proportionally with kilometers
constructed (no relief to congestion if additional roads are built). The sources for the extra VKT
stem from people migrating to places with more roads, increases in commercial traffic, and current
residents just driving more.
With respect to HOV lanes, a new lane may temporarily relieve congestion by drawing vehi-
cles away from the congested general purpose lanes. But, as motorists adjust, those who were
constrained by congestion start taking more trips. Additionally, one main assumption in Duranton
and Turner (2011) is that all types of interstate road lanes are homogeneous in their purpose for
construction; this assumption runs counter to the entire purpose of HOV lanes. Therefore, it is
worth exploring to see if these different types of lanes are having similar or different impacts on
outcomes such as vehicle miles traveled, congestion, commuting, and pollution than those pre-
dicted in Duranton and Turner (2011); that is what the current work directly does with respect to
HOV lanes.
Empirical efforts have been made to examine the effect of carpooling and HOV lanes. Exam-
ples include: Bento, Hughes, and Kaffine (2013), J. D. Hall (2018), Hanna, Kreindler, and Olken
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(2017), and Hughes and Kaffine (2019). Arguably, the estimates proposed in these studies do not
take the endogeneity of HOV lane locations into account: HOV lanes are generally placed in urban
areas with high levels of congestion. Therefore, estimating the true treatment effect of HOV lanes
with respect to commute times will likely be underestimated by naive OLS specifications.
The paper that is most related to this study is a recent working paper (Shewmake, 2018). This
paper theoretically and empirically tests for the impacts of HOV lanes on vehicle miles traveled
(VMT). This paper finds the theoretical impacts of HOV lanes on VMT depend upon local con-
ditions, and that empirically, the impacts of HOV lanes are even more ambiguous. Importantly,
carpooling is considered endogenous in the model, and the author uses an instrumental variables
technique to address the potential bias in the regression estimates. Because of the structure of the
Clean Air Act, attainment status may predict where HOV lanes will be built but does not have a
direct impact on traffic volume. She uses this instrument (Clean Air Attainment status) to predict
the number of HOV lane miles built. However, this instrument is not statistically “strong” on its
own. But, when the instrument is interacted with population, Shewmake (2018) finds that HOV
lanes are associated with an increase in VMT.
In summary, the negative externalities that stem from commuting have a solid footing in the
economics, psychology, and health literatures. However, the economic and behavioral impacts of
HOV lanes on commute times has been vastly understudied, especially from an empirical causal
inference perspective.6 This work aims to fill an important gap in the study of transportation and
infrastructure investment from a methodological standpoint.
6Welfare implications of urban commuting policies have been generally examined (Akbar, Couture, Duranton,
Ghani, & Storeygard, 2018; Anderson, 2014; Barrios, Hochberg, & Yi, 2019; Green, Heywood, & Navarro Paniagua,
2020), but HOV lanes less so.
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1.2 Institutional Setting and Data
1.2.1 HOV Lanes in California
When examining HOV lanes in the United States, in general, there is some concern about missing
data and comparability which could lead to considerable measurement error and biased estimates
of the effect of HOV lanes. To the author’s knowledge, the most up-to-date across-state compila-
tion of HOV lane location and construction dates was published in 2008 (Chang & Bilotto, 2008).
Individually, some states do not have up-to-date transportation and infrastructure information on
their respective department of transportation’s websites. Therefore, even if data across states’ de-
partments of transportation is available, they may or may not be comparable.7 To avoid these
issues, this study focuses on one state that has recently updated HOV lane data: California. Cali-
fornia also has the most HOV miles of constructed HOV lanes in the country, making this an ideal
place to begin to address if HOV lanes cause increases or decreases in commuting times.
According to the California Department of Transportation, all HOV lanes constructed in Cal-
ifornia are never converted from existing lanes on highways; due to a mix of state and federal
funding laws, all new HOV lanes require new construction.8 This is unique to California and im-
portant to my identification strategy. These lanes are different from HOT (high occupancy toll)
or express lanes in that there is no toll or fee associated with using the lane. HOT lanes are not
considered in the current analysis.
In addition to the infrastructure institutional set-up discussed above, building roads in Califor-
nia is quite expensive compared to the national average. According to one study, California spent
about $420,000 per mile in 2013 compared with the national average spending of about $160,000
per mile in the same year. Building just 10 miles of HOV lanes on I-405 in Los Angeles was es-
timated to cost over $1 billion.9 Thus, understanding if the HOV lanes are effective has important
policy and budget implications.
7This fact is especially true if one wants to analyze HOV lane construction and locations pre-2000.
8See Matute and Pincetl (2013) for more details.




The main source of HOV lane data for this paper comes from the California Department of Trans-
portation (Caltrans).10 Caltrans provides information on the specific location of HOV lanes and
other characteristics, including length of the lanes, the location of the lanes, the types of vehicles
allowed in the lanes, and other characteristics such as opening and closing times of the lanes. The
data from Caltrans were manipulated in QGIS11 to determine the presence of HOV lanes at the
county level. Summary statistics are shown in Panel A of Table 1.1. Notably, there is considerable
variation across the 58 counties of California. Figure 1.1 maps the locations of all currently con-
structed HOV lanes in California. Despite there being over 1300 miles of HOV lanes in California,
most of these lanes are concentrated in specific urban areas. This apparent selection into certain
areas requires addressing. An instrumental variable approach is used to overcome this bias. Ad-
ditionally, matching methods are used in data pre-processing. Specific details on the instrument,
matching methods, and the model specification are discussed in Section 3 of the paper.
1.2.2 Commuting in California
Travel data is obtained from the National Household Travel Survey (NHTS) for 2017.12 The Cal-
ifornia sub-sample is utilized in this study. 26,112 unique households were surveyed in the sub-
sample. The California NHTS data consists of four main files: Household, Person, Trip, and
Vehicle. The household file includes information about the households surveyed: home ownership
status, family income, how many cars owned, and even the gas price on the day surveyed. The
person file includes information about the individuals that make up the households: age, driver
status, education level, relationship status, employment status, how they got to work, and how long
it took them to get to work. The trip file describes the times of trips taken by those that were
surveyed. Finally, the vehicle file includes detailed information about the make, model, and type
10California Department of Transportation (2018): http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/tsip/gis/
datalibrary/Metadata/HOV.html
11QGIS (Quantum Geographic Information System) is a free, open-source geographic information system software.
12U.S. Department of Transportation: Federal Highway Administration (2018): https://nhts.ornl.gov/
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of cars owned and driven by those surveyed. These files can be merged and linked with location
information that describes where the homes and workplaces of those surveyed are. For this study,
all analyses will be conducted at the county level.13
Several studies have utilized both the individual state sub-samples, as well as the entire national
sample of the National Household Travel Survey. Notably, Plotz, Konduri, and Pendyala (2010)
examine the impact of HOV lanes across the entire United States. Conservatively, they attempt
to back out the upper and lower bound of HOV lane-induced trip reduction. They find that the
impacts of an HOV lane on trip reduction are minimal or modest at best and have little to no
impact on operating performance of different lanes. The data have also been used to estimate the
effect of different government policies on driving (Spiller, Stephens, Timmins, & Smith, 2012).
Differing from the above studies, the main outcome variable of interest in this study is the
amount of time that it takes people to get to or from work (two separate trips) in minutes. This
information is taken from the trip file of the NHTS. Analysis was restricted to individual trips
whose purpose was to or from work. In this sample, those in the survey that worked outside of
the United States were dropped from the analysis, as well as those who worked in another state.
Everyone who did not drive to work or worked from home was also dropped from the analysis.
Because it is not known with 100% certainty if the survey respondents took an HOV lane to or
from work, this specification can only be considered an intent to treat (ITT) analysis. However, if
in line with previous empirical studies, the induced demand to drive on a certain road caused by
the construction of an additional road lane impacts all drivers who drive on that road, not just
those who would take an HOV lane. The main mechanisms to be tested are the following: (1) does
the presence of any HOV lanes in your workplace county cause an increase or decrease in your
commute time to or from work? and (2) does living closer to an HOV lane increase or decrease
your commute time to or from work?
Summary statistics for commuting characteristics are shown in Panel B of Table 1.1. Similar to
HOV lane locations in California, there is considerable variance across the sample of commuters.
13Publicly available data from the NHTS includes only a county-level indicator for location of home and work.
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The average time it takes a commuter to get to or from work is about 28 minutes. In general, 70
percent of counties in California have “short commutes” on average (less than the state average of
27.89 minutes) and 30 percent have longer average commutes. The average distance to work is
21 miles. The distance to work is not the straight line distance but the road network distance, in
miles, between respondent’s home location and work location. This information was sourced using
the Google Distance Matrix API. Additionally, information on the dispersion of living locations
is provided in the data. As shown in Table 1.2, the California NHTS surveyed a wide variety of
people living in different types of urban areas. Most people in the commuter sub-sample live in
urban areas with heavy rail systems and with 1 million or more people. Approximately one fifth
of the sample does not live in an urban area.
1.2.3 Naive Linear Regression
As a first approximation of the effect of HOV lanes on commute times in California, simple naive
linear regression models are employed. More specifically, the commute time of driver i in county
c in the 2017 California NHTS is estimated in the following way:
CommuteT imeic = β1HOV Treatmentc + γi + φc + εic (1.1)
where HOV treatment is one of the above treatment specifications, β1 is the variable of interest, γi
are individual person and trip controls, and φc are county fixed effects. All standard errors in these
naive regressions are clustered at the county level.
Table 1.3 employs a naive linear regression approach to try to get a baseline estimate of the
effect of HOV lanes on commuting times in California. Different treatment definitions are used to
try to tease out any heterogeneous impacts. More specifically, five different treatment definitions
are used: 1) a 1 or 0 indicator for whether a county has at least one HOV lane passing through it,
2) if a driver’s home county centroid is 50 miles or closer to an HOV lane, 3) if a driver’s home
county centroid is 25 miles or closer to an HOV lane, 4) if a driver’s home county centroid is 10
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miles or closer to an HOV lane, and 5) if a driver’s home county centroid is 5 miles or closer to an
HOV lane. Distances between California county centroids and HOV lanes were calculated using
QGIS.
In all specifications, controls for the individual driver (age, gender, educational attainment, and
occupation type), roadway distance to work, size of the urban area of residence as described in
Table 1.2, and day of travel are employed in the fully specified forms.
Panel A of Table 1.3 shows the regression results without county fixed effects and Panel B of
Table 1.3 shows the regression results with county fixed effects. In all treatment definitions, HOV
lanes and distance to HOV lanes seem to have a positive effect on commute times; in other words,
more HOV lanes in the home county of the driver and living relatively close to a HOV lane is
related to increased commute times to and from work.
Adding county fixed effects to the naive regression approach, as shown in Panel B of Table
1.3, does not change the direction and level of significance; there still appears to be a positive,
statistically significant relationship between being treated with HOV lanes and increased commute
times to or from work. In naive models, however, this positive effect may be underestimated
because HOV lanes are not randomly assigned across the state.
The following section describes the matching procedure implemented as well as the differ-
ent approaches used to overcome the potential endogeneity problems associated with HOV lane
locations and household location decisions.
1.3 Methods
1.3.1 Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM)
One issue with the naive regression approach is that there is concern that the control and treatment
groups across all treatments are not comparable to one another. If these groups are not compara-
ble on observables, then accurate treatment effects cannot be estimated. Table 1.4 examines the
sample means of trip characteristics between treated and non-treated counties in California. The
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differences between these statistics are shown in Table 1.4 as well. It is noteworthy that there are
significant differences between the treated counties and the control counties in this sample in terms
of trip characteristics as well as individual characteristics.
To insure that the treatment and control groups are relatively comparable to accurately estimate
the true treatment effect, I employ coarsened exact matching (CEM). Specifically, observations in
the treatment group are exactly matched with replacement to observations in the control group:
age, gender, educational attainment, occupation type and the trip length measured in roadway
miles. CEM matching also helps by not only ensuring individual observation level balance across
covariates, but works to ensure global balance across the entire sample (Iacus, King, & Porro,
2011).14
Summary statistics for the treated and control groups before matching are shown in Table 1.4.
The means of the control and treatment groups across a select number of covariates are displayed,
along with standard errors in parentheses. A t-test was conducted to determine if there are sig-
nificant differences between the two groups. For the majority of covariates, there are significant
differences between the control and treatment groups, lending credence to the motivation for some
type of data pre-processing. All additional treatment definitions show a similar pattern; specific
estimates for other treatment definitions can be found in the Appendix.
After exact matching with replacement, the means and differences between control and treat-
ment groups are shown in Table 1.5. There are far fewer differences between the control and
treatment groups for the main variables of interest (commute time and distance to work). The
remaining differences between the two groups, notably in the industries of employment, are to be
expected when comparing urban to non-urban areas. Because of this, one can claim that these
groups form more comparable comparison groups.
Because the matching appears to have corrected much of the covariate imbalance between the
control and treatment groups across all treatment definitions, the same linear regression shown
in equation 1.1 was run on the matched samples. The matching had no impact on the level and
14See Patrick and Mothorpe (2017) for an empirical application of CEM.
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direction of significance of the coefficients associated with HOV lane treatment. However, the
magnitude of the coefficients are smaller. Panel A of Table 1.6 shows the naive regression after
matching without county fixed effects; Panel B of Table 1.6 shows the same linear regression with
county fixed effects.
In addition to CEM, nearest neighbor matching is imposed on the sample as a robustness test.
Using the nearest four neighbors, average treatment effects and average treatment effects on the
treated are estimated. Although much smaller than the estimated coefficients from the linear regres-
sion approach, the significant, positive relationship between HOV treatment and commute times
remains. Treatment effects using this matching approach can be found the Appendix Table A.9.
1.3.2 Instrumental Variable (IV): Democratic Vote Share in 2000
To accurately consider the effects of HOV lanes on commuter behavior, one has to consider the
possibly endogenous location choice of HOV lanes, as well as the endogenous choice location of
households. Intuitively, one could claim that California is building HOV lanes in more populous,
urban areas where traffic congestion is a more of an issue facing commuters. Based on Figure 1.1,
this would seem to be the case. Although California has the most HOV lane miles in the country,
most are concentrated in very specific urban areas. A similar conclusion can be drawn from Table
1.8 below. Unfortunately, up until now, most research conducted to determine the impacts on HOV
lanes has not taken this endogeneity of HOV lane location selection into account.
To overcome this endogeneity problem in HOV lane location selection, an instrumental vari-
ables technique will be used. To use HOV lanes to predict commuting times in California, the
following two stage estimation is utilized:
HOV Treatmentc = φ1DVc + γi + εci (1.2)
CommuteT imei = β1 ̂HOV Treatmentc + γi + υci (1.3)
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where HOVTreatment are the different treatment definitions described in Section 2.3, DV is
share of Democratic votes for president in the 2000 election in county c. γi includes individ-
ual controls (age, sex, educational attainment, and occupation category). Observations (trips) are
matched exactly by trip distance in miles and also by individual (trip taker) characteristics.
To the author’s knowledge, this is one of the first studies to use political outcome data to
instrument for infrastructure construction projects. Many papers cite the link between political
outcomes and infrastructure (Brueckner & Selod, 2006; Glaeser & Ponzetto, 2018; Huet-Vaughn,
2019), but using past political outcomes as an instrument for the location of current infrastructure
projects is a contribution of the current work. Knowing that one of the major purposes behind the
construction of HOV lanes is pollution reduction, counties in California that had a higher vote share
for Al Gore in the 2000 presidential election arguably put a higher weight on these environmental
issues when compared to counties with a lower vote share.
To add further weight to the relevance of the instrument, Table 1.7 summarizes the time trend
of HOV lane openings in California. As one can see, the majority of current HOV lanes were
opened after 2000. These lanes counted do not even take those lanes currently under construction
or approved for construction. Using the vote share in 2000 seems to be a potentially relevant
instrument to predict where HOV lanes would later be constructed. Further disaggregation of the
open HOV lane data shows that Caltrans Districts 4 and 7 had the most open HOV lanes before
2000; these same districts also had the most construction of new lanes after 2000. Comparing
Table 1.8 with the voting data displayed in Figure 1.2, it appears that these districts with the
highest propensity for existing and future construction of HOV lanes in and after 2000 correspond
to counties with some of the highest Democratic vote shares in the 2000 election.15
One could worry that 2000 vote shares for Al Gore is highly correlated with present and po-
tentially future urban density, a factor that would have strong impacts on commute times. If this
were the case, the excludability argument for the proposed instrument would not hold. To this
point, it is important to note that the voting behaviors in individuals’ home counties in 2000 do
15A map of the Caltrans districts is shown in Figure 1.3.
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not have an impact on traffic volumes and the time that it takes these individuals to get to work in
2017. But, to control for this potential confounding factor, urban size controls are included in all
IV specifications. With this, and other individual and county level controls, conditional exclusion
arguments are more grounded.
1.3.3 IV: 1947 U.S. Highway Plan
For robustness, a second instrument is proposed. Following prominent literature (i.e. Baum-Snow
(2007); Duranton and Turner (2011)), the 1947 U.S. Interstate Highway Plan will be used to instru-
ment for current HOV lane locations in California (United States House of Representatives, 1947).
Figure 1.4 displays the 1947 interstate highway plan. This plan to drawn with the purpose of in-
creasing the mobility between large cities for trade and national defense purposes. Local driving
patterns and commutes were not considered or attempted to be altered with this highway plan.16
Specifically, this two-stage estimation technique takes the following form:
HOV Treatmentc = φ11947Planc + γi + εci (1.4)
CommuteT imei = β1 ̂HOV Treatmentc + γi + υci (1.5)
where HOVTreatment are the different treatment definitions described in Section 2.3, 1947Plan
is county c’s centroid distance to the 1947 highway plan. γi includes individual controls (age, sex,
educational attainment, and occupation category). Observations (trips) are matched exactly by trip
distance in miles and also by individual (trip taker) characteristics.
β1 is the main coefficient of interest. With conditions of relevance and exclusion, β1 represents
the causal effect of HOV lanes on commuting times. This instrument is relevant to the current
analysis because the plan was drawn to efficiently connect urban areas. As shown in Figure 1.4,
the counties in California with more HOV lanes today are also relatively closer to the proposed
16The digitized map data used is shown in Figure A.1.
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highways in the 1947 plan. This instrument follows the exclusion restriction because it is unlikely
that county distance to nearest 1947 proposed highway impacts an individual’s commute time in
2017 except through the plan’s influence on future HOV lane location. Because the 1947 plan was
drawn without local travel conditions in mind, this adds additional weight to the excludibility of
this proposed instrument in predicting commute times. Controls for urban area size, as well as
individual and travel controls will be used to further enhance conditional exclusion arguments.
1.4 IV Results
Results for the IV models are presented in Tables 1.9 and 1.10. Table 1.9 reports reduced form, first
stage, and second stage results using the 2000 Democratic vote share as an instrument for HOV
lane locations. Table 1.10 reports the reduced form, first stage, and second stage results using the
1947 highway plan as an instrument for HOV lane locations. Robust standard errors are shown
in parentheses and first stage F-statistics are also reported. In all model specifications, first-stage
F-statistics are well above 10.
When examining the first stage results using the 2000 vote share as an instrument for county
distance to HOV lanes, there is a significant and positive coefficient for all treatment definitions.
This is shown in column 2 of Table 1.9. The positive, statistically significant second stage coeffi-
cients (column 3 of Table 1.9) indicate the HOV lanes cause increases in times for people to get
to work in California after controlling for the size of the urban area of residence, day of travel,
and the individuals’ personal characteristics (age, sex, occupation) and living distance from work.
These results are in line with an induced demand mechanism similar to that found in Duranton and
Turner (2011): an increase in the number of road lanes causes an increase in demand to drive on
that road, thereby increasing commute times of all who drive on that road.
Noting the coefficient magnitudes, it appears that the induced demand effects of HOV lanes
are felt most by those who live relatively close to an HOV lane (5 miles or less). This falls in line
with the proposed mechanism as those that live closer to an HOV lane are likely to take a route
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that has an HOV lane, even if those commuters do not take the HOV lane themselves. Because of
the induced demand for the roadway due to the HOV lane, more commuters are likely to take that
route, thereby underestimating the amount of commuters who actually use the HOV lane.
Recalling that all new HOV lane construction in California requires the creation of a new
lane and not a conversion from an existing lane, the results presented here confirm conclusions
posed in Duranton and Turner (2011) that building new road lanes is associated with more vehicle
congestion. If some kind of toll was implemented on these lanes, then the desired outcome of
reduced travel times to work might be achieved.17
To overcome potential concerns with using vote share as an instrument for HOV lanes, county
distance to the 1947 highway plan is used as an instrument for 2017 HOV lane treatments. The
first stage results using this instrument, shown in column 2 of Table 1.10, display a consistently
negative and significant relationship. This result would suggest that the larger the county centroid
distance to the 1947 plan, the closer that county is to an HOV lane in 2017.
The second stage results are shown in column 3 of Table 1.10. Similar to Table 1.9, the second
stage results with the 1947 instrument show HOV lanes consistently cause increased commute
times, conditional on individual, urban size, and travel day controls. Interestingly, the results found
with this instrument do not exhibit the same U-shaped relationship found with the 2000 Democratic
vote share instrument – living closer to an HOV lane does not increase commute times relatively
to living farther away. Still, it is important to note that, no matter the treatment definition or
instrument used, the causal effect of HOV lanes is found to be positive and statistically significant.
Naive OLS models underestimate the impact of HOV lanes on commute times in California.
17There has been some work regarding the welfare impacts of HOT (high occupancy toll) lanes. The results seem
to vary across different areas, and this could be for a number of different reasons beyond the creation of an HOT
lane (varying carpooling preferences across places, exogenous factors influencing carpooling, and just the underlying
fluctuations in carpooling from day to day and from year to year across places). See Burris, Alemazkoor, Benz, and
Wood (2014).
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1.4.1 Limitations and Extensions
One of the major limitations to this study is the lack of detailed commuting data across time. This
study only utilizes data from 2017 in California. Additionally, because the commuting data does
not ask respondents if they use HOV lanes when they go to or from work, this can still just be seen
as an intent to treat analysis. However, if the mechanism of induced demand is at play, the impact
of HOV lanes on commute times affects all commuters, not just those who take an HOV lane to or
from work.
For further extensions of this paper, more detailed data on HOV lanes could be obtained. Data
on HOV lane locations and statuses varies considerably across the country, so expanding this idea
beyond California would take a considerable amount of effort. Additionally, the level of analysis
in this work may still not be detailed enough to try to accurately capture the effects of HOV lanes.
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1.5 Conclusions and Policy Implications
HOV lane construction can be a costly project, but the benefits from this type of project have
been arguably understudied, particularly from a causal inference perspective. This paper finds that
HOV lanes generally cause an increase in commute times to or from work in California using an
instrumental variable approach. To reach these findings, a newly proposed instrument, historic
county vote share, as well as a more well-established instrument, the 1947 highway plan, are
utilized. The results runs counter to the intended purpose of HOV lanes. This finding follows
previous literature discussing the impact of additional road lane construction (Duranton & Turner,
2011). The induced demand from an additional road lane, regardless of its intended purpose,
seems to directly influence the commute times of all who drive on that road. If these lanes are not
18Confidential data from the NREL does include information about the drivers’ census tract, and even exact latitude
and longitude of residence. Re-running the above empirical analysis at the census tract level seems like the next step
to try to uncover the true treatment effect of HOV lanes on commute times.
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reducing commute times, as is their intention, the potential negative consequences associated with
increased commutes and congestion are numerous.19
The policy implications of these findings are particularly important considering that all new
HOV lanes in California are essentially new roads (never converted from existing roads). Not only
is road construction expensive, it is particularly expensive in California due to high land and labor
costs. To recover some lost revenue from constructing these lanes, the California Department of
Transportation could convert them into HOT or express lanes. If places want to keep them free,
counties could promote the use of ride sharing apps and make carpooling easier for those going to
or coming home from work.
19Most obvious are the increase in aggressive and stressful emotions of drivers and additional health risks associated
with pollution from car emissions. See Currie and Walker (2011) and Hennessy and Wiesenthal (1999) for two of
numerous examples of consequences of increased traffic and commute times.
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Table 1.1: California HOV Lanes and Commuting
Mean S.D. Min Max Total (State)
Panel A: HOV Lanes by County
Count of HOV Lanes 2.1 5.07 0.00 29.00 124.0
Total HOV miles 23.6 69.20 0.00 438.20 1370.6
N 58 counties
Panel B: Commuting Characteristics
Time to Work 27.89 28.66 1.00 600.00 18,939
Short Commute 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00 18,939
Long Commute 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 18,939
Distance to Work 20.87 112.56 0.01 3135.34 18,939
N 18,939 trips
Notes: Summary statistics for HOV lanes by California county are shown above in Panel A. Data on HOV lanes were
sourced from the California Department of Transportation. Summary statistics for California commuting are shown
in Panel B. Data is taken from the “Trip” file of the NHTS. Time to work is measured in minutes. Only trips that
indicated they were to or from work were examined. Short commute indicates the proportion of California counties
that had an average commute time below the state average (27.89 minutes). Long commute indicates the proportion of
California counties that had an average commute time above the state average. Distance to work is measured in miles.
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Figure 1.1: California Primary Roads and HOV Lane Locations
Note: Figure displays map of California. Interstates are shown in blue and completed HOV lanes as of 2017 are shown
in orange. Although California has the most miles of HOV lanes in the country, most are concentrated in Sacramento,
San Francisco, and Los Angeles. HOT (high occupancy toll) lanes, those lanes in which a toll is charged to use the
carpool lane, are not included in the analysis.
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Table 1.2: Urban Size Classifications




1 million or more without heavy rail 4,594 24.26
1 million or more with heavy rail 4,767 25.17
Not an urban area 3,836 20.25
Total 18,939 100.00
Notes: Summary statistics for household urban size classification are shown above.
21
Table 1.3: Naive Linear Regression Before Matching: Effect of HOV Lanes on Commute Time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment Binary ≤ 50 miles ≤ 25 miles ≤ 10 miles ≤ 5 miles
Panel A: No County F.E.
HOV Lanes 11.04∗∗∗ 10.77∗∗∗ 9.96∗∗∗ 8.31∗∗∗ 7.28∗∗∗
(3.93) (2.25) (2.27) (2.46) (2.25)
[0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.02]
N 18939 18939 18939 18939 18939
Individual Controls X X X X X
Distance to Work Control X X X X X
Urban Size Controls X X X X X
Travel Day Controls X X X X X
County Fixed Effects - - - - -
R2 0.056 0.057 0.061 0.054 0.050
Cluster-Robust S.E. X X X X X
Panel B: County F.E.
HOV Lanes 17.77∗∗∗ 32.28∗∗∗ 17.77∗∗∗ 17.77∗∗∗ 17.77∗∗∗
(2.42) (2.24) (2.42) (2.42) (2.42)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
N 18939 18939 18939 18939 18939
Individual Controls X X X X X
Distance to Work Control X X X X X
Urban Size Controls X X X X X
Travel Day Controls X X X X X
County Fixed Effects X X X X X
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Cluster-Robust S.E. X X X X X
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and p-
statistics are shown in brackets. All models include individual controls (age, sex, education level, occupation
type), distance to work controls, urban size controls, and travel day controls. County fixed effects are added in
Panel B. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
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Table 1.4: Summary Statistics Before Matching
Control County Treated County Difference
Trip Characteristics
Time to Work 22.86 31.37 -20.30***
(0.30) (0.280) [0.00]
Short Commute 0.93 0.50 67.88***
(0.003) (0.005) [0.00]
Long Commute 0.08 0.50 -67.88***
(0.003) (0.005) [0.00]
Distance to work 20.47 21.14 -0.41
(1.50) (0.92) [0.34]
Driver Characteristics
Male driver 0.48 0.52 -4.66***
(0.006) (0.005) [0.00]
Female driver 0.52 0.48 4.66***
(0.006) (0.005) [0.00]
Less than high school 0.03 0.02 3.84***
(0.002) (0.001) [0.00]
Age 46.24 45.16 5.15***
(0.17) (0.13) [0.00]
Work Characteristics
Sales 0.23 0.21 2.81***
(0.005) (0.004) [0.003]
Manufacturing 0.14 0.09 9.46***
(0.004) (0.003) [0.00]
Number of trips 7,735 11,204
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Means for control and treated counties are shown
above. T-tests were used to test for the difference in means. Standard errors are shown in
parentheses and p-values are shown in brackets.
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Table 1.5: Summary Statistics After Matching
Control County Treated County Difference
Trip Characteristics
Time to Work 22.66 30.73 -18.88***
(0.28) (0.32) [0.00]
Short Commute 0.92 0.52 62.11***
(0.003) (0.006) [0.00]
Long Commute 0.08 0.48 -62.11***
(0.003) (0.006) [0.00]
Distance to work 13.35 16.46 -4.50***
(0.48) (0.49) [0.00]
Driver Characteristics
Male driver 0.48 0.48 0.00
(0.006) (0.006) [0.50]
Female driver 0.52 0.52 0.00
(0.005) (0.005) [0.50]
Less than high school 0.02 0.02 0.00
(0.002) (0.002) [0.50]
Age 46.01 45.99 0.07
(0.17) (0.13) [0.53]
Work Characteristics
Sales 0.23 0.23 -1.12
(0.005) (0.005) [0.13]
Manufacturing 0.13 0.10 5.28***
(0.004) (0.004) [0.00]
Number of trips 7,507 7,507
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Means for control and treated counties are shown
above. T-tests were used to test for the difference in means. Standard errors are shown in
parentheses and p-values are shown in brackets.
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Table 1.6: Naive Linear Regression After Matching: Effect of HOV Lanes on Commute Time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment Binary ≤ 50 miles ≤ 25 miles ≤ 10 miles ≤ 5 miles
Panel A: No County F.E.
HOV Lanes 8.39∗∗∗ 9.68∗∗∗ 8.95∗∗∗ 7.84∗∗∗ 7.33∗∗∗
(3.72) (2.00) (1.97) (2.21) (2.25)
[0.03] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01]
N 15014 10420 16376 15712 14016
Individual Controls X X X X X
Distance to Work Control X X X X X
Urban Size Controls X X X X X
Travel Day Controls X X X X X
County Fixed Effects - - - - -
R2 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07
Cluster-Robust S.E. X X X X X
Panel B: County F.E.
HOV Lanes 14.59∗∗∗ 24.21∗∗∗ 15.65∗∗∗ 16.58∗∗∗ 13.62∗∗∗
(2.17) (1.99) (1.99) (1.99) (2.10)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01]
N 15014 10420 16376 15712 14016
Individual Controls X X X X X
Distance to Work Control X X X X X
Urban Size Controls X X X X X
Travel Day Controls X X X X X
County Fixed Effects X X X X X
R2 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11
Cluster-Robust S.E. X X X X X
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and p-
statistics are shown in brackets. All models include individual controls (age, sex, education level, occupation
type), distance to work controls, urban size controls, and travel day controls. County fixed effects are added in
Panel B. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
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Figure 1.2: Votes for Al Gore in the 2000 Presidential Election
Note: Figure displays heat map of votes for Al Gore in the 2000 presidential election. Higher concentrations of votes
may indicate preferences for environmentally friendly pursuits. Comparing with Figure 1.1, the locations of HOV
lanes are highly correlated with larger vote shares for the Democratic party in the 2000 election.
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Table 1.7: Timing of HOV Lane Openings
Before 2000 In or After 2000 Total
# of HOV lanes open (as of 2017) 43 81 124
Under Construction (as of 2017) - 57 57
Planned Construction - 11 11
Notes: Table shows the timing of HOV lane construction across the state of California.
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Figure 1.3: HOV Lanes, Primary Roads, and Caltrans Districts
Note: Map shows the divisions of Caltrans districts. Blue lines represent California primary roads, while orange lines
represent HOV lanes. Source: https://dot.ca.gov/caltrans-near-me
Table 1.8: Open HOV Lanes by Caltrans District
Caltrans District 3 4 7 8 11 12
Major Metro. Area Sacramento San Fran. L.A. San Bern. San Diego Orange County
# of HOV lanes open before 2000 4 10 14 5 4 6
# of HOV lanes open after 2000 8 34 17 12 3 7
Notes: HOV lanes by Caltrans district are shown above. The sample is split before and after 2000 to highlight the
persistent nature of HOV lane construction – places that historically had more HOV lanes continued to construct
them.
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Figure 1.4: 1947 Interstate Highway Plan
Note: Figure displays the 1947 highway plan drawn by the U.S. House of Representatives. This plan was drawn to
increase mobility between U.S. cities for the purposes of domestic trade and national defense. Source: United States
House of Representatives (1947).
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Table 1.9: 2SLS Estimates With 2000 Democratic Vote Share After Matching: HOV Lanes on
Commute Times
(1) (2) (3)
Reduced Form 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Panel A: Any HOV Lane in County
County Vote Share for Democratic President 49.473*** 0.731***
(3.679) (0.040)




Panel B: ≤ 50 miles to nearest HOV Lane
County Vote Share for Democratic President 46.653*** 1.992***
(3.926) (0.040)




Panel C: ≤ 25 miles to nearest HOV Lane
County Vote Share for Democratic President 48.149*** 2.509***
(3.319) (0.033)




Panel D: ≤ 10 miles to nearest HOV Lane
County Vote Share for Democratic President 52.542*** 1.740***
(3.610) (0.041)




Panel E: ≤ 5 miles to nearest HOV Lane
County Vote Share for Democratic President 53.237*** 1.216***
(3.615) (0.043)




Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent variable is commute time to work in minutes. Robust standard
errors are shown in parentheses. First stage F-statistics are reported, as well as the number of trips included in each
treatment definition (N). Instrument for HOV lane treatment is the 2000 vote share for a Democratic president. All
models include individual controls (age, sex, education level, occupation type), distance to work controls, urban size
controls, and travel day controls.
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Table 1.10: 2SLS Estimates With 1947 Highway Plan After Matching: HOV Lanes on Commute
Times
(1) (2) (3)
Reduced Form 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Panel A: Any HOV Lane in County
Distance to 1947 Plan -0.071*** -0.004***
(0.009) (0.000)




Panel B: ≤ 50 miles to nearest HOV Lane
Distance to 1947 Plan -0.055*** -0.002***
(0.010) (0.000)




Panel C: ≤ 25 miles to nearest HOV Lane
Distance to 1947 Plan -0.073*** -0.004***
(0.009) (0.000)




Panel D: ≤ 10 miles to nearest HOV Lane
Distance to 1947 Plan -0.080*** -0.007***
(0.010) (0.000)




Panel E: ≤ 5 miles to nearest HOV Lane
Distance to 1947 Plan -0.079*** -0.007***
(0.012) (0.000)




Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent variable is commute time to work in minutes. Robust standard
errors are shown in parentheses. First stage F-statistics are reported, as well as the number of trips included in each
treatment definition (N). Instrument for HOV lane treatment is the county centroid distance to nearest segment of the
1947 highway plan. All models include individual controls (age, sex, education level, occupation type), distance to
work controls, urban size controls, and travel day controls.
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Chapter 2
The Empirical Political Economy of Local
Road Maintenance
Roads and highways are linked to location of employment, population, and economic growth
(A. Agrawal, Galasso, & Oettl, 2017; Baum-Snow, 2007; Chandra & Thompson, 2000; Duran-
ton & Turner, 2011). Maintaining transportation links is crucial for economic activity, and U.S.
states under-provide maintenance investment (Kalyvitis & Vella, 2015). However, maintenance is
expensive; state and local investment in government nonresidential fixed assets, like infrastructure,
cost $304.3 billion in 2018 (Zhao, Fonseca-Sarimento, & Tan, 2019).
According to Winston (2013), policymakers have wasted resources by investing, or not invest-
ing, in infrastructure projects not selected by careful analysis.1 If political motivations shift timing
and location of road maintenance projects at the local level (Glaeser & Shleifer, 2005), measuring
the size and nature of shifts is crucial given the importance of infrastructure maintenance for eco-
nomic activity (Kalaitzidakis & Kalyvitis, 2004; Rioja, 2003). In Figure 2.1, we graph the count
of road maintenance projects in the city of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Strikingly, the month before
the local mayoral election (October) has less projects during mayoral election years, which sug-
1Elected officials respond to incentives and one of their goals is to retain their position. Re-election is determined
by receiving votes from specific geographic units, which could lead to inefficient spending patterns (Weingast, Shepsle,
& Johnsen, 1981).
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gests political incentives are relevant for road maintenance in Pittsburgh.2 The research question
we examine is if reduced autumn maintenance, during mayoral election years, is due to political
incentives.
A shift in maintenance across city wards and months due to election year incentives likely
represents a deviation from the optimal maintenance plan.3 Deviating from the optimal mainte-
nance plan is costly, since longer delays in maintenance work leads to higher costs of maintenance
(Burningham & Stankevich, 2005). Furthermore, new road construction is often more politically
favorable in the long-run compared to road maintenance (Schmitt, 2015). Balancing new construc-
tion and maintenance of existing infrastructure has been shown to increase aggregate output and
reduce income inequality (Gibson & Rioja, 2017).
Existing results in the literature find seemingly contradictory signs for the political value of
road maintenance/construction. Empirical results suggest road maintenance increases party vote
share in a county-level analysis for one state (Huet-Vaughn, 2019), but the theoretical results sug-
gest urban voters oppose road construction (Glaeser & Ponzetto, 2018). Brueckner and Selod
(2006) and Glaeser and Ponzetto (2018) both consider the traffic and disruption of urban interstate
construction a disamenity to local residents.4 One discrepancy between theoretical (Brueckner &
Selod, 2006; Glaeser & Ponzetto, 2018) and empirical analyses (Huet-Vaughn, 2019) is the geo-
graphic level of interest. Different levels of analysis could be the sole reason the findings differ, but
prior empirical work only takes place at a scale larger than the local city level. Previous attempts
to estimate the effect of political incentives on urban infrastructure have occurred at the regional
(Knight, 2005) or national (Rioja, 2003) level, despite the fact that government agents in the the-
oretical models (Brueckner & Selod, 2006; Glaeser & Ponzetto, 2018; Glaeser & Shleifer, 2005)
2Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania data is used in this paper.
3Deviating from optimal maintenance due to election cycles implies Road Needs Repair = f(β ∗
Election Y ear = 1, Climate, Truck VMT, other) , β = 0. The amount of road repair necessary is not a
function of election cycles, absent political incentives.
4The empirical results in Huet-Vaughn (2019) suggest vote-maximizing politicians should strategically locate
maintenance in places that are less likely to vote for them in an upcoming election, as that election approaches.
The theoretical findings (Brueckner & Selod, 2006; Glaeser & Ponzetto, 2018) suggest vote-maximizing politicians
should do the opposite.
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are best thought of as being local leaders exercising power at the local level. More empirical work
towards discovering the source of these discrepancies is warranted.
This paper uncovers the causal effect of political incentives on road maintenance decisions at
the local city level using difference-in-differences (DD). The post period is mayoral election years.
Treatment and control groups are defined using registered voters of the opposite party of the mayor.
Proportion of registered voters of the opposite party is a plausible measurement of the intensity of
political incentive to complete maintenance at certain times in city wards. The data are well-suited
to address spatial scale as being a factor in seemingly contrasting prior findings.5
Road maintenance projects are shifted across months during mayoral election cycles according
to alignment deviation of the constituency. During mayoral election years, wards with relatively
large deviations in political alignment away from the mayor see a significant increase in road
maintenance projects in summer months compared to more similar wards. This suggests road
maintenance is perceived as a signal of competence to unaligned areas in the summer months of an
election year. However, this pattern flips in October, the month before the votes are cast in mayoral
election years. This is consistent with political leaders not wanting to upset constituencies with
the disamenity of road maintenance as the election draws closer. These results suggest that road
maintenance is both as a disamenity and signal of competence.
Using estimates from the literature on the cost of maintenance as a function of how long main-
tenance is delayed (Burningham & Stankevich, 2005), the DD coefficients are used to quantify the
infrastructure maintenance financial cost due to local political incentives. These cost calculations
are conservative due to the relatively uncontested political environment of Pittsburgh. The calcu-
lations suggest local elections in medium-large cities in the U.S. have cost over $185.5 million in
the past sixty years, over $3 million a year.6
5The spatial scale of the current analysis is the local level; this allows investigation into whether spatial scale causes
differences between previous empirical and theoretical findings.
6Cities with at least 100,000 people are considered at least medium-sized (World Population Review, 2020).
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2.1 Literature
First, we discuss the political economy and road maintenance. Then, we describe the political
alignment literature, since it influences the methods. Finally, we summarize research on road
maintenance.
2.1.1 Theoretical Political Economy and Infrastructure
Political economy matters for infrastructure investment and maintenance. Glaeser and Ponzetto
(2018) highlight the rise of disamenities in urban areas associated with road construction and the
response by political actors to these constituent-faced disamenities.7 The disamenities of construc-
tion explicitly mentioned include noise, pollution, and eminent-domain concerns. Glaeser and
Shleifer (2005) show theoretically and through three case study examples, some mayors shape the
electorate to benefit their re-election possibilities. The so-called “Curley Effect,” named for the
infamous Boston mayor’s extraordinary proclivity to pursue politically-minded transfers, shows
local, elected officials reallocate public funds when political gains can be accrued.
2.1.2 Political Alignment
Many studies investigate the effect of political alignment on transfers resulting from federalist
systems of government, where nationally collected taxes are distributed to lower levels of govern-
ment. Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) study Spain’s 900 municipalities over 10 years and
finds intergovernmental transfers are more likely among levels of government that are of the same
party. Similar investigations use data from India (Asher & Novosad, 2017), Brazil (Brollo & Nan-
nicini, 2012), Portugal (Migueis, 2013), and Italy (Bracco, Lockwood, Porcelli, & Redoano, 2015).
Bracco et al. (2015) develops a theoretical model which assumes rational voters who interpret pub-
lic good provision as a signal of incumbent competence. This assumption stands in contrast to the
7The conclusions of the model in Glaeser and Ponzetto (2018) are supplemented using an analytic narrative of
U.S. road infrastructure in the post World War II era. The narrative simplifies the era into three rough chapters of U.S.
national investment in roads: a period of over-investment due to national subsidies, a period of under-investment as the
disamenities of construction became clear, and then a period where large sums were spent to mitigate the disamenities.
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disamenity assumption of Glaeser and Ponzetto (2018). Bracco et al. (2015) also assume the elec-
torate does not observe the grant allocation; however, road maintenance is a visually salient public
good (Glaeser & Ponzetto, 2018).
2.1.3 Road Maintenance, Public Capital Expenditure, and Growth
Road maintenance, in general, has been linked to economic growth. Rioja (2003) finds evidence of
substitution to road maintenance from new “prestige projects” could increase GDP in a sample of
Latin American countries. The theory is extended by Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis (2004) to allow
the government to allocate towards maintenance and new public capital. Other extensions of the
theory between maintenance and growth include: allowing maintenance to increase durability and
quality of infrastructure (Agénor, 2009) and heterogeneous agents (Gibson & Rioja, 2017). 8
2.2 Data
The city of Pittsburgh defines the boundaries of the analysis in this paper. Pittsburgh is unique
in that it keeps a record of historical road maintenance projects. Type of maintenance, date of
completion, and location are included in this detailed data set.
Below, we further detail the data sources. Next, we describe the political institutions of Pitts-
burgh to justify the data used. Then, we describe the formation of the sample. We show descriptive
statistics and interpret initial t-tests for differences in means, which are the foundation of the DD
method.
8Empirical findings suggest that Canada spends too much on public capital and that the reduction in spending
should come primarily from maintenance instead of new capital to be optimal for economic growth (Kalaitzidakis &
Kalyvitis, 2005). However, evidence from U.S. states suggests that maintenance spillover effects are more productive
than new capital expenditures spillover effects (Kalyvitis & Vella, 2015).
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2.2.1 Maintenance Projects
Pittsburgh differs from many other cities in that it publishes a detailed road paving schedule which
includes the year a project started, the exact date it finished, and the type of maintenance job it was.9
Only the most heavy/invasive maintenance projects are used, because they are most inconvenient.
They are most disruptive in terms of noise and air pollution and need a longer time to complete,
potentially adding travel time to trips along that route.10 Table 2.1 details project types.
2.2.2 Pittsburgh Political Wards
The Pittsburgh ward shapefile is publicly available from the Western Pennsylvania Regional Data
Center. Measures of voter registration are annually updated after the May primary elections.11
Figure 2.2 displays how wards deviate from the within ward average proportion of registered Re-
publicans in Pittsburgh across wards across all years in the sample. Wards in orange signify rela-
tively unaligned wards in a given year, while navy wards represent wards that were relatively more
politically aligned. Mayoral election years (2009, 2013, and 2017) are shown on the diagonal.
Figure 2.2 demonstrates adequate within- and across-ward variation in political alignment over the
sample.
2.2.3 Pittsburgh Institutional Details
There are several relevant institutional details about the city of Pittsburgh. Pittsburgh is governed
under a mayor-city council system; the mayor acts as the head of a nine person council. Under
leadership of the mayor, the council decides the location and timing of road maintenance projects
on city-owned roads. The council “...regulates revenues and expenditures, incurs debt, and ap-
9The road maintenance data for the city of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania is publicly available via the Western Penn-
sylvania Regional Data Center. There are N= 5,978 completed maintenance projects recorded in this data set for the
period 2009-2017. Start date is not observed.
10Classification of “heavy” and “non-heavy” road maintenance based off of the authors’ research and judgement.
11Source: https://www.alleghenycounty.us/elections/election-results.aspx. This data
is publicly available in every year of the sample from the Allegheny County Election Results website.
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proves the final operating and capital budgets for the city.” 12 In this system, mayoral political
incentives could affect road maintenance location and timing.
The mayor is the only executive official elected through a city-wide vote, meaning the mayor’s
constituents are located across the whole city.13 The city council members are only elected by votes
in their respective districts, meaning the council members’ constituents are only located in the
members’ districts. Using city council votes is not appropriate for studying city-wide maintenance
decisions, while alignment during mayoral election years may affect city-wide maintenance.
2.2.4 Sample Creation
Road maintenance projects are joined to political wards using the boundaries they are geographi-
cally within. Each project has an associated date, enabling the creation of a ward-month-year level
dataset. Next, yearly voter registration data are merged to maintenance projects. There are 32
wards over 9 years and 8 months, resulting in a sample of 2,592 observations.14
2.2.5 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.2 shows descriptive statistics for the number of completed heavy maintenance projects by
alignment and whether it is a mayoral election year. Wards are considered aligned if they deviate
from their within-ward average towards being very aligned. Months are split into aligned and
unaligned wards, because that is how the treatment/control groups are formed. The table is split
by mayoral election year, because the method uses non-election years as years when difference in
alignment has no justification for mattering for maintenance decisions.
12Source: https://pittsburghpa.gov/council/index.html. The council includes a standing com-
mittee that handles all details associated with the city Public Works department. The Public Works department may
initiate contracts to pursue road maintenance projects, but the projects’ timing, location and budget need final approval
by the council and mayor. See https://pittsburghpa.gov/council/public-works for more details.
13The City Controller is also a city-wide vote, but the City Controller is not involved in road maintenance planning.
See https://pittsburghpa.gov/controller/.
14January-March observations are dropped, because there is little maintenance activity in these months. December
2017 is dropped, because the majority of these projects do not finish until after the sample period ends.
38
The research design compares the difference between unaligned wards and aligned wards in
non-mayoral election years to the difference in mayoral election years. Table 2.2 shows row-wise
t-tests for differences in means, between mayoral and non-mayoral election years of the same
treatment group and month. In aligned wards in June, 2.64 more projects are completed in non-
election years compared to election years. However, for politically unaligned wards 2.84 fewer
projects are done in non-election years in July. During election years, there is less maintenance in
aligned wards in June and more maintenance projects in unaligned wards in July. In October, there
are 2.55 more projects completed in unaligned districts in non-election years than election years.
2.3 Method
The econometric model is difference-in-differences, in which June-October of mayoral election
years is the treated period.15 The model is specified
Maintenancemyw = exp(β1IEPmy + β2PAyw + β3PAyw ∗ IEPmy + µw + φy + γm), (2.1)
in which m stands for month, y for year, and w for ward. µw is a vector of ward fixed effects to
control for unobservable, time-invariant ward-level heterogeneity. φy is a vector of year and γm
is a vector of month fixed effects to control for variation in maintenance over time and seasonal,
monthly maintenance. Maintenance stands for number of completed heavy maintenance projects.
IEP stands for the inter-election period. Poisson estimation is appropriate, because the dependent
variable is discrete.16 To facilitate interpretation of the DD coefficient (β3), OLS models are also
used with the dependent variable being meters of completed heavy road maintenance.
15During mayoral election years, these are the months between the primary and the election date.
16Poisson models estimate unbiased, consistent coefficients if the conditional mean is correctly specified
(Wooldridge, 1999). Poisson is preferred over negative binomial for two reasons. The first is that errors in the model
are likely correlated by ward, so the preferred model estimates cluster-robust standard errors at the ward level. An
implication of using cluster-robust standard errors in a Poisson model is that it has been shown to correct for over-
dispersion of the dependent variable (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). Another reason Poisson is preferred for panel data
is negative binomial models have been shown to not be “true fixed-effects” models (Allison & Waterman, 2002).
39
2.3.1 Alignment
Ideally, treatment signifies a subset of wards where the mayor has different re-election incentives.
Prior research defines treatment two ways: one, considering areas above a 50% threshold for a
geographic area to be affiliated with a specific representatives’ party. Two, comparing small differ-
ences near 50% (Lehne, Shapiro, & Eynde, 2018; Migueis, 2013). Leveraging a 50% threshold is
impossible in this data, because 50% is outside the range of registered Republicans (2.5%-25%).17
To define a treatment indicator for an area where the mayor faces different re-election incen-
tives, in the absence of a 50% threshold, within-ward deviation from ward averages are used. From
the May primary elections files, the number of registered voters of each party is used to construct
a measure of the political alignment. Political alignment is defined as PAwy = 1 if:
PAwy = 1(Zwy − Zw > Z̃), (2.2)
in which Zwy stands for registered Republicans (in standard deviations from within ward average)
in a ward in a year, Zw is the mean political alignment in a ward over the entire sample, and Z̃ is
the median deviation across all 288 (32 wards X 9 years) ward-year combinations.18,19
Pittsburgh’s political environment is relatively uncompetitive. One may worry that even the
within-ward deviation approach may not accurately capture the political behavior of the mayor
given the lack of within- and across-party challengers during the sample period. We argue that if
potential challengers within or across parties gain enough support, incumbency or re-election is
no longer guaranteed. It is, therefore, in the controlling party’s interests, even in the face of low
levels of perceived competition, to make the greatest number of constituents happy. This prevents
the rise in popularity of future political opponents.
17The distribution of proportion Republican in a ward-year is shown in Figure B.3b.
18The distribution of within-ward deviations are shown in Figure B.3a.
19This approach combines investigation of the head elected official (Glaeser & Shleifer, 2005) with the literature on
federal grants and local governments based on political alignment (Bracco et al., 2015; Solé-Ollé & Sorribas-Navarro,
2008).
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Sensitivity to Choice of Political Alignment Cutoff One issue is choosing Z̃ for PAwy in Equa-
tion 2.2.20 Figure 2.3 shows how meters maintained depends on within-ward, registered Republi-
can Z-score to probe for sensitivity to choice of Z̃. Figure 2.3 suggests results are insensitive to
choice of Z̃, an effect is found over the entire distribution of Zwy. The relative slopes of the effects
are consistent with the differences identified in Table 2.2.
Increase in Unaligned Deviation Affects Maintenance Differently by Month Panel A in Fig-
ure 2.3 suggests wards with higher proportions of registered Republicans receive more mainte-
nance in summer of election years, and Panel B shows wards with more registered Republicans
receive less maintenance in October of election years. This is caused by high Republican Z-scores
having many non-zero values of meters of heavy maintenance in summer months of election years
(Panel A, Figure 2.3), but many zero values of meters in October of election years (Panel B, Figure
2.3). The estimated effect of higher proportions of Republicans (slope of dotted, orange line) does
not change paved meters of road completed by season in non-mayoral election years, consistent
with a political incentives mechanism.
2.3.2 Identification
The model addresses seasonality of road maintenance in two ways. First, it compares politically
aligned to politically unaligned wards in the same years and months when weather and other un-
observables affecting maintenance are unlikely to be different across wards. Second, it controls
for monthly differences using month fixed effects. This ensures results are not driven by seasonal
maintenance patterns. Other covariates that are related to maintenance include the price of inputs
and weather. It is highly unlikely that these unobservables are different across different wards,
making them unlikely to bias β3, the key variable of interest.
The identifying assumption is in the absence of the mayoral inter-election period altering po-
litical incentives, road maintenance in politically aligned and politically unaligned wards contin-
20Table 2.2 relied on choosing Med(Z)w over all years.
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ues trending similarly during the months between the primary and general elections. Only two
pre-registration months are observed in each of the three mayoral election years, so the common
pre-trends are difficult to observe. An implication of the identifying assumption, which is more vi-
sually noticeable, is there are no discernible patterns or differences between aligned and unaligned
wards in non-mayoral election years which begin during placebo periods of June-October.
Parallel Trends Figure 2.4 presents maintenance over time, disaggregated by alignment, to in-
vestigate the implications of the identification assumption visually. Every year of data (2009-2017)
is represented by a separate figure, because treated wards change every year as the within-ward
political alignment deviation changes relative to the within-ward median. Mayoral election years
(2009, 2013, and 2017) are shown on the diagonal; red vertical lines define the inter-election pe-
riod. Non-election years are shown in all other figures and use black vertical lines to define the
months of interest. In each figure, navy represents politically aligned wards and orange represents
unaligned wards. The figure also complies with the expectation that maintenance is seasonal: more
maintenance takes place in the summer months.
In non-mayoral election years (off-diagonal figures), the number of completed maintenance
projects is not systematically different for aligned compared to unaligned wards.21 There is no
systemic difference, aligned compared to unaligned wards, in October in non-mayoral election
years. In election years (figures on the diagonal), there is a systematic difference between aligned
and unaligned wards during the inter-election period. In June, July, and August of the three mayoral
election years, unaligned wards have the same or more maintenance in 7 out of 9 months; in
October, aligned wards have more or the same maintenance in all mayoral election year Octobers.
Figure 2.4 is consistent with a corollary of the common trends assumption: there is no difference
between aligned and unaligned wards in non-mayoral election years, giving some confidence to a
causal interpretation of the results.
21In 2010 and 2011, the aligned and unaligned wards cross frequently. In 2012 and 2016, the unaligned wards
are on a higher level. In 2014 and 2015, the aligned wards are on a higher level. In almost all of these off-mayoral
election years, the month to month change looks to be either noise or the trend looks the same. This non-systematic
difference/pattern in differences between aligned and unaligned wards in off-mayoral election cycle years supports the
implication of the identifying assumption.
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2.4 Results
This section presents main results. First, difference-in-differences results are presented. Next,
randomization inference shows statistical significance is not due to few overall or treated clusters.
2.4.1 Difference in Differences
Table 2.3 presents estimates from Equation 2.1. Panel A, column 1 considers the entire June-
October period between voter registration and when votes are cast for the mayoral election; the DD
coefficient is not statistically significant. A possible explanation is column 1 aggregates all months
in the IEP together, and the opposite effects at the tail ends of the IEP cause the magnitude to
appear relatively small and insignificant in the DD coefficient. Empirical studies have documented
that time to election matters for how strong political incentives are (e.g. Berdejó and Yuchtman
(2013)). Column 2 of Panel A only includes August-October in the IEP and finds no effect.
Column 3 only includes October in the IEP. The DD coefficient is positive and becomes statis-
tically significant above 99 percent confidence in column 3. The DD coefficient can be interpreted
that even though there is less maintenance during October, specifically October of the mayoral
election years, there is comparatively more maintenance being completed in politically aligned
wards.22 The magnitude of the DD coefficient suggests there are 267 percent more projects in
October of an election year in politically aligned wards, compared to unaligned wards.23
Panel B investigates months further from when votes are cast in November. In column 2,
the effect of political alignment during election seasons is negative and statistically significant.
Although there are more projects being completed in June-August, which is consistent with this
time being prime maintenance season and shown by the June-August in election year dummy,
those maintenance projects are occurring in primarily unaligned areas. The magnitude of the DD
coefficient can be interpreted as an 118 percent increase of projects in politically unaligned wards
compared to politically aligned wards in June-August of election years.
22Note that this holds the effect of October constant with month fixed effects also.
23The coefficient magnitude is calculated: (e1.30 − 1) ∗ 100 = 267 percent.
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The results suggest there is a detectable effect of political incentives on road maintenance
timing and location. Additionally, the signs are strongest and opposite in the tail months of the
inter-election period. This finding is consistent with the political incentive argument: the election
is most salient to voters the closer it is to the election. To avoid potentially upsetting or incon-
veniencing potential voters in the unaligned areas of the city close to the election, projects are
strategically shifted. The relative magnitudes of the significant DD coefficients suggest there is
a net reduction in the amount of maintenance completed in an election year since there are less
projects substituted into aligned wards during October than are substituted out in June-August. It
also suggests maintenance projects are both a disamenity and a signal of competence.
2.4.2 Inference Robust to Few Clusters
The confidence intervals in Table 2.3 are calculated using cluster-robust standard errors at the
ward level. There are 32 wards and only some are treated in each mayoral election year, so the
cluster-robust confidence intervals could be inappropriately narrow (Cameron & Miller, 2015). To
address the potentially narrow standard errors, a permutation test is used which is less vulnerable
to low amounts of clusters (Fisher, 1935).24 This procedure is based on Fisher’s exact p-value. The
procedure randomly shuffles political competition Z-scores within wards across different years.25
Placebo distributions of test statistics are displayed in Figure 2.5. Figure 2.5a investigates in-
ference on the DD coefficient for summer months. The actual test statistic from the DD coefficient,
IEP X PAUp, in Table 2.3, Panel B, column 2, is less than 999 of the false test statistics. This im-
plies an exact Fisher p-value of 1/1000 = 0.001. Figure 2.5b shows the distribution of Z-statistics
for the same procedure, except now the coefficient of interest is IEP X PAUp from Column 3, Panel
A, of Table 2.3. In this case, the actual Z-statistic on IEP X PAUp is greater than 992/1000 placebo
Z-statistics, implying a Fisher exact p-value of 8/1000 = 0.008. Using an inference method less
vulnerable to issues involving few clusters strengthens the conclusions of statistical significance.
24This is a similar approach used by Cunningham and Shah (2018) to deal with narrow confidence intervals from
few clusters.
25This keeps the distribution of political alignment within wards the same.
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2.5 Ward Boundaries as Variation in Political Alignment
Several concerns are addressed with spatial discontinuity plots.26 The estimated DD coefficients
could not be interpreted as causal if road maintenance causes changes in the political alignment
of wards.27 Although this is unlikely, the possibility cannot be ruled out in a DD framework. Ad-
ditionally, if there are omitted third variables which are correlated with the treatment (political
alignment) and outcome (road maintenance), then the DD coefficient is biased. Finally, leveraging
geographic variation helps address concerns about low variation in the treatment of proportion of
registered Republicans in the DD coefficient of Equation 2.1. The plots compare road segments
close to either side of ward borders where the political alignment is different between wards, lever-
aging geographic variation in how far the project is from being located in a certain ward.28 Roads
close to boundaries are probably similar; plausibly, the only difference is road segments on either
side are treated by different levels of political alignment.29
2.5.1 Data Construction
We split the roads of Pittsburgh into 1-meter segments. The universe of roads in Pittsburgh is used
to construct the road-segment level data set. The 2018 TIGER/Line shapefile of Allegheny County
roads comes from the U.S. Census Bureau website. The 2018 file includes all roads in Allegheny
County as of January 1, 2018, ensuring all roads that could have ever been maintained in the sample
period are included. 30 A dummy variable is created for every 1-meter segment to indicate if that
segment was maintained for every possible month-year combination in the sample.31
26D. R. Agrawal (2015) uses state borders to examine discontinuous differences in state retail taxes. Cantoni (2020)
studies differences in voting costs (distance to polling location) for individuals that live near a voting precinct border.
This study extends approaches that use spatial boundaries for geographic units to a new question.
27If the lack of road maintenance causes a certain ward to become less politically aligned, for instance, this would
threaten the causal interpretation of the DD estimates.
28Wards boundaries are plausibly arbitrary and do not change in the sample.
29The unobservables that affect road maintenance such as labor costs, weather, auto traffic, etc. are likely similar on
either side of the political boundary. This implies unobservables are unlikely to bias the effect of political alignment.
30Interstates and state routes are excluded to limit the data to only roads the city of Pittsburgh is responsible for
maintaining. The roads and projects are displayed in Figure B.2.
31There are approximately 210 million segment-month-year level observations.
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The distance from the midpoint of segments to nearest political ward boundary is calculated.
Distances are converted to negative values if the political alignment deviation of the ward the
project took place in was more negative than the political alignment deviation of the closest bor-
dering ward.32 Each boundary is assigned either an alignment switch or no alignment switch
classification, for each year based on the political alignment deviation in wards on either side. 33
2.5.2 Distribution of Roads at the Ward Boundary Cutoff
Figure B.4 shows there is a large increase in the number of 1-meter segments near the ward bound-
ary border/cutoff. The large increase is consistent with roads also serving as ward boundaries. In
the following analyses, road segments within ten meters of the border are dropped.34
2.5.3 Maintenance Differences at Ward/Alignment Boundaries
Figure 2.6 shows maintenance changes at ward boundaries for different combinations of months,
in years with and without a mayoral election, and for differing alignment statuses on either side
of the cutoff.35 Due to sparse data, lowess fits are used to summarize mean maintenance instead
32The possible closest ward boundaries are restricted to those interior in the city; boundaries defining the city limit
or those bordering rivers on one side are dropped as possible closest boundaries.
33If a boundary is classified as unaligned, the two wards on either side of the boundary deviated in opposite direc-
tions in a given year. An aligned boundary had wards that deviated in the same direction of political alignment in that
year. If a maintenance project is located in a ward with positive alignment, but was closest to an unaligned bound-
ary, a positive distance value was assigned to that project; projects in relatively unaligned wards closest to unaligned
boundaries were assigned negative distances. For example, if maintenance took place on a 1-meter segment in a ward
that deviated towards political alignment that year and that project is closest to a boundary with an unaligned ward on
the other side, the distance for that road segment in that year is defined as positive.1-meter segments that are located
in wards with the largest deviation towards political alignment are assigned positive distances in cases where the two
wards on either side of the ward boundary both deviated towards political alignment. 1-meter segments that are located
in wards with the smallest deviation towards political unalignment are assigned positive distances in the cases where
both wards on either side of a boundary deviated towards political unalignment.
34This dropping is similar to donut RD approach. This approach is not what the donut approach is typically used for;
it is mainly utilized for dealing with those observations most likely to have sorted into/out of treatment. An advantage
of dropping projects is projects could extend over borders or be applied to boundary roads where it is difficult to
differentiate between which alignment to assign to a ward. Road segments may also differ substantially due to their
use as ward boundaries.
35Figure 2.6 shows mean probability of maintenance on either side of the ward boundary cutoff. Observations just
to the right of the red line are road segments which are just inside a politically aligned ward. The y-variable has the
interpretation of the probability that the segment is maintained, conditional on distance from being in a more politically
aligned ward. The y-variable is a small number because there are thousands of road segments within each bin and
maintenance is a relatively rare outcome.
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of global fits, so differences at the cutoff are not influenced by distant outliers. Points right of the
cutoff are in more politically aligned wards than wards to the left.
In Figure 2.6a, only summer months where alignment status changes at the cutoff in mayoral
election years, are included. Figure 2.6a shows a reduction in mean heavy maintenance at the ward
boundary cutoff for politically aligned wards. Both slopes are negative as the cutoff is approached
from either side, but is steeper for aligned wards. In Figure 2.6b, there is no difference right at the
cutoff. However, there is a difference that becomes apparent at 70 meters away from the cutoff.36
In aligned wards, at 70 meters away from the cutoff in election years, there is an increase in road
maintenance that does not also happen for unaligned wards.
Three falsification exercises are performed. The first examines non-mayoral election years,
where the alignment status changes at the border, because there is no mechanism for maintenance
to differ by alignment status outside of mayoral election years. Figures 2.6c and 2.6d show no dif-
ference in maintenance at the cutoff in non-election years. The next falsification exercises leverage
wards where alignment does not change at the border.37 In Figure 2.6e, there is a slight difference
at the border, but the slopes are oppositely signed and so the difference is converging towards 0 at
the cutoff. In Figure 2.6f, maintenance increases far from the borders on both sides of the cutoff.
Figure 2.6g uses wards where alignment status does not change at the boundary, in non-mayoral
election years, finding no difference in maintenance at the cutoff. Figure 2.6h shows a difference
in maintenance at the cutoff; however, the difference is due to the last point closest to the cutoff
in aligned wards which is much lower than nearby points on the same side of the cutoff. The
effects in Figures 2.6a and 2.6b are plausible and consistent with the DD results and a majority of
falsification exercises are supportive of the mechanism of political incentives for differences at the
border.
36Whether roads 70 meters away from a cutoff are similar enough for unobservables to be similar on either side of
the cutoff is debatable. It is believed this is a fair assumption.
37Boundaries of wards that deviated in similar directions and intensities are included. For reference, ward bound-
aries that divide either two dark navy wards or two dark orange wards in Figure 2.2 are the boundaries classified as
“alignment same.”
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2.6 Costs of Elections for Road Maintenance
Table 2.4 replicates Table 2.3 using meters of completed maintenance as the new dependent vari-
able, because it is easier to use for cost calculations. The DD coefficient in column 4 of Table 2.4 is
interpreted as 605.76 meters less maintenance are completed in aligned wards during June-August
of election year. The DD coefficient in column 1 suggests that 565.48 meters of that maintenance
is substituted into politically aligned wards in October of election year.
The estimates from Table 2.4, along with some supplemental data, are used to calculate the cost
of political incentives for road maintenance in Pittsburgh.38 Delayed road maintenance causes the
cost of maintenance to be higher (Burningham & Stankevich, 2005). Taking the estimates from
Burningham and Stankevich (2005), an exponential curve is fit to their two data points.39 The
equation of the fitted exponential curve is: (1.0153 * (exp(0.5796 * delayed years))). Plugging
in 4/12 for “delayed years,” this equation calculates delaying maintenance by four months causes
maintenance to be 1.231 times more expensive.40
Using this multiplier requires knowing undelayed, per meter maintenance costs. The cost of
1 meter of road maintenance in Pittsburgh is $45.55 per meter on average.41 The cost of the
delayed meters multiplied by the cost multiplier extrapolated from Burningham and Stankevich
(2005) (605.76 meters * $45.55 cost/meter * 1.231 delay multiplier) implies an additional cost of
$33,966 due to political incentives per mayoral electoral cycle. Second, there are 605.76 meters
less maintenance in politically aligned wards in June-August, but only 565.48 additional meters in
politically aligned wards in October. This suggests 40.28 meters of heavy road maintenance are
38These estimates only quantify the cost for road maintenance, but there could be other costs (Bauernschuster,
Hener, & Rainer, 2017).
39Figure B.6 shows the fit. A (0,1) point is added, because no delay cannot make maintenance more expensive.
40The findings are 605.76 meters of road maintenance are delayed by 3-5 months from the June-August period until
October. Splitting the 3-5 month difference, all road maintenance is assumed to be delayed by four months.
41For each year, the per meter average cost is calculated by taking the total paving expenditures in Figure B.1 and
dividing by the total length of maintenance. Then, the average across years is calculated, weighted by the expenditure
amount in each year. This is done to account for years that happened to have larger amounts of spending on paving.
Not weighting like this does not change the average per meter cost by more than $1.92 per meter.
48
not completed in each mayoral election cycle. For reference, one small pothole is considered to be
about 1 square meter, so one mayoral election cycle causes 40.28 small potholes in Pittsburgh.42
Assume the election cycle potholes are not repaired right away and are repaired at some point
before the next election. For simplicity, the potholes assumed to be repaired in two years (splitting
the difference between 0 and four years later). At 40.28 meters and a cost of $45.55/meter, the
initial cost of this foregone maintenance is $1,835. Given a two-year delay multiplier of 3.236, the
total cost of the roadwork that was not substituted from June-August in the same year is $5,938.43
Adding together both the cost of the roads that are delayed during the season, $33,966, and the
roads that are assumed to be maintained in at a later time, $5,938, is a total cost of $39,904 due to
one mayoral election cycle in Pittsburgh.44
2.6.1 Across Comparable Cities
The previous section calculates costs for Pittsburgh; however, local election cycles are frequent
and widespread, so estimates across the whole U.S. calculated. Comparable cities from the Fed-
eral Highway Administration’s list of urban areas with more than 750,000 residents in 2018 are
used.45 One-election-cycle delayed maintenance costs Pittsburgh $39,904, so this figure is multi-
plied across forty-seven cities in the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)’s list of urban areas.
The cost of maintenance delays, across 47 cities, from one U.S. local election is $1,875,488.46
42Average pothole information found at: https://suma.org/img/uploads/documents/
communitiesoftomorrow/Pothole%20Guidelines.pdf. Additional costs of potholes that are not
included in the estimates are potential damages to vehicles attributable to potholes and potential time costs due to
slower commutes caused by potholes.
43This is conservative, because the road maintenance could be put off much longer than two years.
44For reference, the per capita income for a Pittsburgh resident in 2017 was $51,187.
45Source: https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/onh00/onh2p11.htm. Table B.1 shows these cities.
46To use more comparable cities, several variables from the FHWA data are used to exclude cities measurably dis-
similar from Pittsburgh. Variables used include population, population density, total highway miles, highway miles
per capita, highway miles travelled per capita, average annual daily traffic (AADT), etc. Because Pittsburgh sits near
the average for these variables, cities not within two standard deviations of the average of each variable are dropped
for not being comparable. Table B.1 also shows cities that were dropped and a description of the variable that caused
ten cities to be dropped to build a more similar comparison group. Using these comparable thirty-seven cities instead,
the total cost of one U.S. local election cycle for only similar, large cities is $1,476,448.
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In addition to large cities, smaller-sized cities are also likely to suffer from mayoral election
cycle distortions.There are 310 cities with a population of at least 100,000 (World Population
Review, 2020).47 Additionally, local election cycles take place frequently, so a time period over
which to calculate costs must be chosen. There are three periods of road construction in recent U.S.
history according to Glaeser and Ponzetto (2018); the second one begins in 1960.48 Since 1960,
sixty years ago, there have been fifteen local election cycles in thirty-seven comparable cities.49
Multiplying the cost over cities with a 2020 population of at least 100,000, over the last sixty
years, $185.5 million dollars has been lost due to delayed maintenance from local U.S. elections.
An $185.5 million loss could maintain 4,072,446 meters at the Pittsburgh maintenance cost per
meter, or the entire city of local roads in Pittsburgh (2.8 million 1-meter segments) 1.45 times.
2.6.2 Low Political Competition Implies Estimates are Lower Bounds
Another factor leading costs being underestimated is if distortion due to political incentives is
larger in other cities. This is a fair concern, especially given that Pittsburgh has not had a Repub-
lican mayor since 1934, and the nine person city council has been entirely Democratic since 1933.
To understand how much potential there is for under-estimation of costs due to more political com-
petition in other cities, compared to the Pittsburgh baseline, data on party of mayors are gathered
going back to 1960.50 Table B.1 lists the number of Republican mayors for each of the forty-seven
cities from the FHWA list.51 Of the forty-seven cities on this list, thirty-one have had at least one
47According to World Population Review (2020), there are 19,495 incorporated cities, towns, and villages in the
United States and 14,768 have populations under 5,000, making them very different than Pittsburgh.
48This period is characterized by increasing political organization and opposition to new construction, so it is used
as the period over which local elections increase the cost of maintenance.
49Assuming a local election occurs every four years.
50Data were collected from city websites and publicly available information. Some cities have incomplete informa-
tion regarding the political party of their mayor over time. Nevertheless, this constructed variable shows the variability
of cities relative political “competitiveness” across the county.
51Number of Republican mayors is an appropriate approximation of political competition because the closer this
number is to the midpoint of the number of local elections since 1960 (0,15), the more times the office has changed
party control.
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Republican mayor, implying they are more politically competitive than Pittsburgh.52 This supports
the claim the cost estimates are conservative when multiplied across other similar cities in the U.S.
2.6.3 Maintenance Shifts Have Consequences for Road Safety
Table B.2 shows suggestive evidence that local election cycle maintenance shifts are also related to
car crash outcomes.53 In ward-month-years with less maintenance, there are fewer crashes (Panel
A, column 4), people involved in crashes (Panel B, column 4), and heavy truck accidents (Panel
D, column 4). In ward-month-years with more maintenance, there are a greater number of major
injuries (Panel C, column 1). These additional effects on safety are not included in any of the cost
calculations presented in the previous section.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper finds politically aligned wards have less maintenance projects in months farther from
the election, but more maintenance projects in months close to the election. The results are not
caused by maintenance seasonality, too few clusters, arbitrary definitions of political alignment or
relying solely on temporal variation. Oppositely signed coefficients for months on either side of the
inter-election period suggest road maintenance is both a disamenity and a signal of competence.
This paper makes three contributions. First, political budget cycle analysis is extended to a
salient, observable public good. Evidence that political incentives interfere with road maintenance
beyond reducing maintenance in favor of new projects is found. If maintenance is planned despite
politicians favoring new construction, political incentives delay maintenance, leading to higher
costs (Burningham & Stankevich, 2005). This is another way political incentives interfere with the
optimal spending of public money, in the context of road maintenance.
52The average number of Republican mayors is 2.33, suggesting that some other cities may be orders of magnitude
more competitive than Pittsburgh.
53Car crash data comes from the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) website: https://
crashinfo.penndot.gov/PCIT/welcome.html.
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The second contribution is advancing literature at the intersection of infrastructure and po-
litical incentives. This paper finds results consistent with both Glaeser and Ponzetto (2018) and
Huet-Vaughn (2019), suggesting road maintenance can be both a signal of competence and a dis-
amenity. Furthermore, some results are consistent with Huet-Vaughn (2019) at a smaller spatial
scale, suggesting the interaction of maintenance and political incentives may not depend on scale.
Third, the results document a new source of political distortions to infrastructure maintenance:
local election cycles. This new source of political distortion can be added to several already pro-
posed by Winston (2013). The cost of this political distortion to infrastructure maintenance is
calculated across cities with at least 100,000 residents (in 2020) and found to cost at least $185.5
million. These results and cost calculations provide a warning to policy-makers concerning road
maintenance decisions; allowing politics to enter the maintenance decision-making process will
harm the fiscal position of cities by increasing expenses at no benefit other than for political gain.
Some limitations which could be addressed with future research. First, other cities are not
investigated, because historical maintenance data is not publicly available for other cities. The data
includes only maintenance projects on existing roads, not construction of new roads. Construction
is the main topic of interest in Glaeser and Ponzetto (2018), but maintenance is a close substitute.
The maintenance data includes an end date but not an exact start date, so the exact amount of
maintenance time for each project is unknown. Finally, the city of Pittsburgh is not politically
competitive relative to other large cities. Low political competition suggests the findings could be
lower bounds of the political incentive mechanism’s effect on local road maintenance.
Detter and Fölster (2017) suggest a way to reduce the impact of political concerns is to have
financial asset managers make decisions. This has the drawback of reducing accountability, but a
potential benefit of reducing distortion due to political incentives. In Pittsburgh, one election costs
less than the income per capita of a Pittsburgh resident, making effects ambiguous.54
54In a more politically competitive city with more distortions, this option warrants further consideration.
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Figure 2.1: Monthly Completion of Heavy Road Maintenance in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Note: Graph displays sum of heavy paving projects per year in the city of Pittsburgh from 2009-2017. The red line
represents years when there is a mayoral election. The blue line represents years that do not have a mayoral election.
Mayoral elections are held in 2009, 2013, and 2017. Numbers represent raw project, not adjusted to yearly averages.
Red-dashed lines mark the length of the inter-election period. Non-election years refers to non-mayoral election years,
which includes national election years of 2012 and 2016.
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Table 2.1: Types of Maintenance Projects
Type of Maintenance Description Classification
Heavy
Base Repair Removing damaged pavement, determining cause Heavy
of failure and appropriate solution, resurfacing
of road
SuperPave Pavement mix designed to combat deformation Heavy
and low temperature cracking
Mill and Overlay (SuperPave) Existing pavement removed, milled, surface Heavy
overlaid with SuperPave pavement
Mill and Overlay, ≥ 3” Existing pavement surface removed, milled to a Heavy
depth of greater than 3 inches, surface overlaid
with new asphalt pavement
Non-Heavy
Mill and Overlay, < 3” Existing pavement surface is removed, milled to Non-Heavy
depth of less than 3 inches, surface is overlaid
with new asphalt pavement
AC Overlay Pavement is placed down on top of existing Non-Heavy
pavement, no milling of existing road
Mechanical Patching Small areas and irregularities patched over Non-Heavy
Profile Milling Just the edges of the road are milled down Non-Heavy
Note: Types of maintenance projects completed in Pittsburgh are shown above.
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Figure 2.2: Within-Ward Political Alignment by Time and Space
Note: Within-ward political alignment deviations across Pittsburgh wards for all years of data (2009-2017). Mayoral
election years are on the diagonal. Deviations in alignment within a ward are measured as 0.675 standard deviation
changes from that same ward’s median political alignment measure. The proportion of registered Democratic voters
is used to proxy for political alignment. If a ward became “less politically aligned” (more registered Republicans)
relative to its average alignment across the sample time period, it is shown in orange above as a negative change (-);
“more politically aligned” (less registered Republicans) is shown in navy above as a positive change (+). Between 0
and 0.675 standard deviations from the median are shown in lighter shades of these respective colors (Small negative
change: (-); small positive change: (+)) Greater than 0.675 standard deviations from the median in either direction are
represented by darker shades of their respective colors (Large negative change: (-)(-); large positive change: (+)(+)).
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics, Number of Heavy Maintenance Projects Completed
Mayoral Election Year
Non-Election Year Election Year Row T-Test
Maintenance Mean SE Maintenance Mean SE Difference
Before Inter-Election Period
April-Unaligned (n=144) 1.45 (0.54) 0.31 (0.19) 1.14
April-Aligned (n=144) 1.96 (0.52) 0.65 (0.29) 1.31*
May-Unaligned (n=144) 2.34 (0.58) 4.35 (1.21) -2.01*
May-Aligned (n=144) 1.84 (0.47) 2.50 (0.77) -0.66
Inter-Election Period
June-Unaligned (n=144) 2.44 (0.80) 1.52 (0.90) 0.92
June-Aligned (n=144) 3.61 (0.80) 0.98 (0.31) 2.64**
July-Unaligned (n=144) 1.47 (0.42) 4.31 (1.01) -2.84***
July-Aligned (n=144) 2.13 (0.44) 2.00 (0.74) 0.13
August-Unaligned (n=144) 3.41 (0.67) 3.77 (0.81) -0.36
August-Aligned (n=144) 2.70 (0.67) 1.77 (0.52) 0.93
September-Unaligned (n=144) 0.67 (0.22) 0.98 (0.40) -0.31
September-Aligned (n=144) 2.50 (0.45) 2.58 (0.87) -0.08
October-Unaligned (n=144) 2.93 (0.73) 0.38 (0.19) 2.55**
October-Aligned (n=144) 1.50 (0.38) 1.21 (0.39) 0.29
After Inter-Election Period
November-Unaligned (n=144) 1.29 (0.33) 0.56 (0.28) 0.73
November-Aligned (n=144) 0.79 (0.24) 0.38 (0.14) 0.42
December-Unaligned (n=120) 0.06 (0.05) 0.00 (0.00) 0.06
December-Aligned (n=136) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.01
Note: The mean count of heavy maintenance projects per ward in each month-alignment classification is shown, sep-
arated by whether it is a mayoral election year (2009, 2013, 2017) or not. Descriptions of heavy projects are shown in
Table 2.1. There are three election years and six non-election years in the data. The mean count of heavy maintenance
over the total nine years is also shown. Alignment classification is determined by within-ward deviations in political
alignment in a given year. N is the number of wards that fall into each month-alignment classification over the length of
the data (2009-2017). SE = standard error. Row T-test conducted to compare election year completed road maintenance
to non-election year completed road maintenance in each month. For the T-test column: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Figure 2.3: Meters of Maintenance by Within-Ward Political Deviation Z-Score and Month in
Inter-Election Year
Note: n = 288 ward-year observations (144 observations each for election and non-election years). Dependent variable
is meters of road maintained. Independent variable is within-ward registered Republican deviations from within-ward
average (Republican Z). Only heavy maintenance included. Legend consistent for all panels. Orange points represent
meters of completed maintenance at each Z-score in non-mayoral election years, while blue points represent meters
of completed maintenance at each Z-score in mayoral election years. The dashed-orange line is the line of best fit for
non-election years and the solid blue line is the line of best fit for election years.
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Figure 2.4: Political Alignment and Maintenance Project Trends by Year
Note: Election years (2009, 2013, and 2017) for the mayor are shown on the diagonal using red vertical lines to define
the inter-election period. Non-election years, representing the counterfactual inter-election periods in which the mayor
is not up for election, are shown in all other figures and use black vertical lines to define the inter-election period. The
navy series in each year represents the maintenance projects in wards that had a higher within-ward deviations towards
being more politically aligned with the mayor (higher deviations towards less registered Republicans for a given
ward-year). The orange series in each year represents the maintenance projects in wards that had higher within-ward
deviations towards being politically unaligned. Dependent variable is count of heavy maintenance projects completed.
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Table 2.3: How Narrowing Months Affects Number of Heavy Maintenance Projects
Panel A: Removing Summer Months
(1) (2) (3)
Jun-Oct Aug-Oct Oct
Political Alignment Above Deviation Median (PAUp) -0.16 -0.24** -0.24*
(0.13) (0.12) (0.12)
Jun-Oct in Election Year (IEP) 0.03
(0.33)
IEP X PAUp -0.22
(0.20)
Aug-Oct in Election Year (IEP) -0.26
(0.21)
IEP X PAUp 0.22
(0.25)
Oct in Election Year (IEP) -1.77***
(0.57)
IEP X PAUp 1.30***
(0.50)
Treated Observations 240 144 48
Panel B: Removing Months Near Election
Jun Jun-Aug Jun-Oct
Political Alignment Above Deviation Median (PAUp) -0.20 -0.07 -0.16
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
Jun in Election Year (IEP) -0.68
(0.64)
IEP X PAUp -0.35
(0.62)
Jun-Aug in Eletion Year (IEP) 0.46*
(0.26)
IEP X PAUp -0.78***
(0.21)
Jun-Oct in Election Year (IEP) 0.03
(0.33)
IEP X PAUp -0.22
(0.20)
Treated Observations 48 144 240
Observations 2560 2560 2560
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the ward level are shown
in parentheses. Estimates are from Poisson conditional fixed effect model, shown in Equation 2.1.
Ward, month, and year (uninteracted) fixed effects are included in every column. Grouping months
by relative distance to the election are shown in columns 1-3. Panel A isolates the months closest to
the election, while Panel B isolates the months furthest from the election. IEP stands for inter-election
period. PAUp stands for political alignment. The DD coefficient of interest for every column in
both panels is “IEPxPAUp.” Treated observations denote the number of ward-month-year observations
which are 1 for IEPXPAUp.
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Figure 2.5: Randomization Inference
Panel A: June-August DD Coefficient Placebo
Z-Statistics Distribution
Panel B: October DD Coefficient Placebo Z-Statistics
Distribution
Note: Political alignment is shuffled within wards, across years. This leaves the distribution of alignment within-ward
the same. Panel A: The test statistics displayed are from estimating IEP X PAUp in the Panel A, column 2 of Table
2.3 under falsely randomly assigned political alignment within ward across years. The actual test statistic is lower
than the falsely randomized test statistics in 999/1000 permutations. In Panel B: The test statistics displayed are
from estimating IEP X PAUp in Panel B, column 3 of Table 2.3 under falsely randomly assigned political alignment
within ward across years. The actual test statistic is greater than the falsely randomized test statistics in 992/1000
permutations.
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Figure 2.6: Ward-Level Spatial RD Plots, Combining Tests and Falsification
Panel A: Mayoral Elections, June-August, Alignment
Change at Border
Panel B: Mayoral Elections, October, Alignment
Change at Border
Panel C: Non-Mayoral Elections, June-August,
Alignment Change at Border
Panel D: Non-Mayoral Elections, October,
Alignment Change at Border
Panel E: Mayoral Elections, June-August, Alignment
Same at Border
Panel F: Mayoral Elections, October, Alignment
Same at Border
Panel G: Non-Mayoral Elections, June-August,
Alignment Same at Border
Panel H: Non-Mayoral Elections, October,
Alignment Same at Border
Note: Panels D and H drop out national election years, 2012 and 2016. Blue dots are politically unaligned, red dots
are politically aligned. X-axis is distance to more politically aligned ward (meters). Within 10 meters of boundary
dropped due to the likelihood they are exactly on the border. Fitted lines are locally weighted sum of squares (lowess)
using a tricube weighting function.
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Table 2.4: Continuous Meters
More Maintenance Entire IEP Less Maintenance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Oct Aug-Oct Jun-Oct Jun-Aug Jun
IEP -881.34*** -295.13** -59.49 303.87 -535.91
(218.48) (137.40) (202.73) (228.20) (446.76)
IEP * PA 565.48** 323.81 -69.37 -605.76*** -150.94
(254.61) (213.18) (161.45) (195.40) (345.44)
Treated Observations 48 144 240 144 48
Observations 2560 2560 2560 2560 2560
Note: * p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01 Estimates are from OLS two-way fixed effects models.
Model includes ward, year, and month (uninteracted) fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered at
the ward level, are shown in parentheses. DD coefficient of interest is “IEPxPA.” The dependent
variable is meters of road maintenance in a ward-month-year.
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Chapter 3
Unintended Consequences of the
Appalachian Development Highway System
on Mortality
Transportation infrastructure construction has been linked to the location of employment, inno-
vation, population, and economic growth (A. Agrawal et al., 2017; Baum-Snow, 2007; Chandra
& Thompson, 2000; Duranton & Turner, 2011, 2012; Michaels, 2008).1 Increased accessibil-
ity through lower transportation costs represents one of the main mechanisms through which in-
frastructure impacts locations (Brooks & Donovan, 2020; Holl, 2016). Little economic research
focuses on the relationship between transportation driven accessibility changes and health out-
comes.2 Standard economic models of health outcomes do not include locational characteristics
among factors affecting health outcomes (M. Grossman, 1972). However, changes in transporta-
tion infrastructure could generate both intended and unintended impacts on health outcomes. For
example, a more extensive road network could increase access to physicians and doctors, improv-
ing individual health outcomes.
1See Redding and Turner (2015) for an overview of this literature.
2Currie and Walker (2011) and Knittel et al. (2016) discuss the effect of transportation infrastructure on infant
health outcomes; this paper focuses on end-of-life outcomes for the entire population.
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The economic history literature contains a few examples of papers that estimate a causal re-
lationship between infrastructure construction and health outcomes. These papers focus on the
advent of modern transportation modes in the 19th century. Zimran (2020) analyzed the impact
of the expansion of canals on mortality in Antebellum United States and Tang (2017) analyzed
the impact of railway expansion on mortality in Japan. Both papers found significant increases in
mortality from communicable diseases caused by the expansion of modern transportation modes.
Other papers that examine the direct relationship between health and transportation infrastructure
fail to establish a causal relationship or only examine inputs to health, rather than health outcomes
themselves (Bell & van Dillen, 2018; Blimpo, Harding, & Wantchekon, 2013).
Recent research found reduced travel times positively associated with decreased mortality
among hospital patients. An analysis conducted in both rural and urban counties in Oregon and
Washington found rural patients more likely to die within 24 hours, relative to urban patients, due
to higher transfer rates between health care centers and longer travel times to hospitals (Newgard
et al., 2017). In several regression models in Røislien, Lossius, and Kristiansen (2015), travel time
was a significant predictor of mortality in Norwegian municipalities.
This literature identifies important differences in health outcomes for urban and rural patients.
Urban patients are more likely to live near hospitals and health care facilities. Over 40 million
Americans lack access to a level I trauma center within a 60 minute drive from their home; most
of those 40 million live in rural areas (Branas et al., 2005). This distinction likely affects health
outcomes in Appalachia, a largely rural, isolated region.
Due to the lack of comprehensive public transportation across Appalachia, access to health-
care and other amenities depends heavily on road networks. Appalachia is a region historically
associated with concentrations of poverty and reduced accessibility in terms of transportation. To
overcome these issues, particularly focused on accessibility concerns, Congress created the Ap-
palachian Regional Commission (ARC) to provide federal funding to states and counties in the
Appalachian region to address limited accessibility by building highways. This highway con-
struction project represents one of the largest place-based policies ever implemented in the United
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States. At its inception in 1968, ARC allocated over 75% of the initial $1.1 billion of federal funds
received to construct the Appalachian Development Highway System (ADHS).3 Construction of
the ADHS began in the late 1960s and continued for over 50 years. This research focuses on the
impact of the ADHS on morality in Appalachia. It investigates the presence of both intended and
unintended effects on mortality.
Estimating the causal influence of the ADHS on mortality outcomes requires accounting for
the non-random assignment of highway segment construction over space and time in Appalachia. I
exploit an instrumental variables (IV) approach similar to past research using historic infrastructure
maps to analyze the current effects of infrastructure (A. Agrawal et al., 2017; Baum-Snow, 2007;
Baum-Snow, Brandt, Henderson, Turner, & Zhang, 2017; Duranton, Morrow, & Turner, 2014;
Duranton & Turner, 2011; Garcia-López, Holl, & Viladecans-Marsal, 2015; Hsu & Zhang, 2014).4
The new instrument proposed in this paper is the President’s Appalachian Regional Commission
(PARC) highway map created during the Kennedy administration. This map was drawn before
the guarantee of federal funding for Appalachian highway construction and before official federal
classification of the “Appalachian” region.
The instrument is relevant because the unused highway plan resembles, and directly informed,
the actual construction plans used for the ADHS. The instrument is excludable, like Baum-Snow
(2007) and Duranton and Turner (2011), because it is plausible that the only reason an unused 1964
Appalachian highway plan affects mortality over time is through its strong relationship to actual
ADHS road construction. This exclusion restriction becomes more plausible when conditioning
on county level factors such as hospital density, simultaneous ARC health development projects,
and historic road infrastructure density.
Instrumental variable results show that ADHS construction causes reductions in heart disease
and hypertension mortality rates. A decrease in county centroid distance to an ADHS segment
decreases mortality rates in certain decades in the sample. These results likely reflect a mecha-
3The remaining 25% of the $1.1 billion was allocated to other development projects in the region (Comptroller
General of the United States, 1976).
4In addition to historic infrastructure maps, economic analyses have included old maps to study a variety of topics
including, but not limited to, Africa’s slave trades (Nunn, 2008) and Indian city shape and sprawl (Harari, 2020).
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nism in which ADHS road construction improved individual access and travel time to healthcare
facilities. Controlling for the number of local hospitals, the number of contemporaneous ARC
health-related investment projects, and 1960 county-level road density confirm these results. The
impact dissipates in later decades in the sample.
Findings also suggest that accident mortality rates in Appalachia increased as distance to
ADHS segments decreased, especially in the last two decades in the sample period. The increase in
accident mortality reflects increases in drug and medicinal overdoses and not other accident causes
such as car accidents. Overdose mortality increases by 0.80 standard deviation. This result implies
that, while the ADHS road construction improved some mortality outcomes early in the sample
period, it caused an increase in other mortality outcomes as the highway network, and use of the
network, increased later in the sample period. In sum, not all segments of the ADHS generated the
same effects on mortality, and not all mortality outcomes changed in the same way over time.
As of 2021, the ADHS spans over 3,000 miles across 13 states. Over the course of con-
struction, approximately $11.2 billion dollars was spent to reach current completion levels.5 An
additional $10.9 billion dollars in spending will be required to complete the remaining segments
of the ADHS. Due to the large share of federal funding devoted to the ADHS compared to other
non-infrastructure ARC funded projects, the current research critically informs the evaluation of
the overall impact of the ADHS on the Appalachian region.
The net mortality changes caused by the ADHS over the sample period contributed approx-
imately $24.2 billion dollars morality-related costs to society. However, the statistical value of
additional lives lost does not outweigh the total benefits from improved travel times, increased
employment, and higher incomes in the Appalachian region (Economic Development Research
Group, 2017). This implies the ADHS infrastructure project still generated a net benefit despite
the large costs associated with mortality.
This paper contributes to three bodies of literature. This paper contributes to the analysis of the
effectiveness of place-based transportation infrastructure policies by analyzing end-of-life health
5Reported in current year spending, not adjusted for inflation (Economic Development Research Group, 2017).
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outcomes, not previously examined in the literature, generated by a large-scale place-based policy.
The paper employs a novel historical map, the President’s Appalachian Regional Commission
highway map, as an instrument, contributing to the literature using historical maps as instruments.
This work also contributes to the literature evaluating ARC policies by using a causal inference
approach.
The remainder of the paper is organized as followed – Section 3.1 provides a brief history of the
ADHS and reviews relevant literature, Section 3.2 describes the primary data sources utilized, Sec-
tion 3.3 discusses the method and identification strategy, Section 3.4 presents the results, Section
3.5 provides robustness and mechanism arguments, Section 3.6 provides a benefit-cost analysis of
the ADHS, and Section 3.7 concludes.
3.1 Historical Background and Literature Review
3.1.1 Appalachian Development Highway System
The President’s Appalachian Regional Commission (PARC) was created by President John F.
Kennedy in the early 1960s to carefully analyze problems throughout Appalachia and suggest
policy recommendations to help the region “catch-up” with the rest of the country. On the sub-
ject of isolation, the report noted that “the Interstate Highway System has largely bypassed by
Appalachian Region, going through or around the Region’s rugged terrain as cost-effectively as
possible” (PARC, 1964). To potentially overcome this isolation, the report says the following:
Developmental activity in Appalachia cannot proceed until the regional isolation has
been overcome...by a transportation network which provides access to and from the
rest of the nation and within the region itself...The remoteness and isolation of the re-
gion, lying directly adjacent to the greatest concentrations of people and wealth in the
country, is the very basis of the Appalachian lag. Its penetration by an adequate trans-
portation network is the first requisite of its full participation in industrial America.
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Figure 3.1a shows a copy of the planned “development highway” described in the PARC report.6
After continuous lobbying by the Conference of Appalachian Governors, the Appalachian Re-
gional Development Act (ARDA) was proposed in Congress in the spring of 1964. At first the
ARDA failed to receive sufficient support, however, the bill was resubmitted to Congress in 1965
following a few changes, including the addition of Ohio and South Carolina as beneficiaries of fed-
erally funded projects. The modified ARDA was signed into law on March 9, 1965. The Act cre-
ated the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) and initially designated counties in Alabama,
Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Virginia, and West Virginia to receive $1.1 billion in federal grants with $840 million earmarked
for highway spending (Comptroller General of the United States, 1976)7.
Since its inception in 1965, the ARC region has grown. In 1967, as shown in Appendix Figure
C.1, Mississippi and New York saw several counties’ entry into the ARC boundary. Including this
1967 expansion, 47 counties have been added inside the ARC boundary to be eligible for federal
grants, bringing the total count of Appalachian counties from 373 in 1965 to 420 in 2020.8
This paper’s focus is related to highway development in the Appalachian region due to the
creation of the ARC. The purpose of highway construction in Appalachia has been cited to be
two-fold: open areas with an economic developmental potential and improve local access to ed-
ucational, health, recreational, commercial, and industrial facilities (Rephann & Isserman, 1994).
As of 2021, approximately 90% of the highway system has been constructed and opened to traffic.
Jaworski and Kitchens (2019) aim to answer questions concerning the effect of the ADHS
on total income in the United States, and how various counterfactual highway networks would
have impacted total income differently. Motivated by a model of inter-regional trade, the authors
estimate the elasticity of total income with respect to market access, which they then use to evaluate
the overall impact of the ADHS. They find that removing the ADHS would have reduced total
6Figure 3.1b shows a digitized version of Figure 3.1a with just the planned highway segments extracted.
7The remaining $260 million was devoted to a wide-reaching collection of development projects from education
to land stabilization (Comptroller General of the United States, 1976)
8In addition, eight independent cities in Virginia have also joined the ARC region over time, with most joining in
2008.
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income by $54 billion in the United States and $38 billion, or 4.4 percent, in the Appalachian
region.
The road data from Jaworski and Kitchens (2019) come from newly digitized network data of
the Appalachian, interstate, national, and state highway systems in 1960, 1985, and 2010. Jaworski
and Kitchens (2019) notably use an instrumental variables strategy to isolate variation in changes
in market access based on physical distance and the change in average speed between county pairs
due to improvements throughout the transportation network. In regards to the current work, the
same area has been georeferenced, but a larger quantity of construction progress maps have been
digitized to capture yearly variations in road segment openings across time.
3.1.2 Mortality and Place-Based Policies
Location-based health outcomes runs contrary to popular health models. In traditional models of
the demand for health (M. Grossman, 1972), one’s utility from health is realized with investment
in medical care. The Grossman model, however, assumes individual factors such as education,
income and geographic location to be independent from one’s health demand. Exploring these
factors as they relate to mortality outcomes has important implications for the health economics
literature and policy. The current work contributes to the growing “place-based health outcomes”
literature.9
The association between location and mortality, although not traditionally modelled, has a few
empirical footholds in the literature. Early works attempted to find correlations between economic
development and life expectancy. For example, Preston (1975) examines the positive correlation
between income and life-expectancy across the United States. Murphy and Topel (2006) find
improvements in long-run health outcomes create substantial economic gain to society.
Later empirical studies have focused on quasi-experimental approaches to examine the effects
of location on mortality. Doyle (2011) uses health emergencies of visitors to Florida to show that
9For more general overviews of the mortality literature, please see Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney (2006), Currie
and Schwandt (2016), and Chetty et al. (2016).
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hospitals in high-spending areas produce better health outcomes than hospitals in low-spending
areas. J. Hall and Neto (2018) test the impact of MedExpress entry on different health outcomes
in the Appalachia region. They find MedExpress entry leads to a reduction in short-term hospital
admissions, inpatient days, outpatient visits, and trips to the emergency room (supply side out-
comes). Finkelstein, Gentzkow, and Williams (2019) find that individuals moving from a 10th to
a 90th percentile location would increase life expectancy at age 65 by 1.1 years, and equalizing
location effects would reduce cross-sectional variation in life expectancy by 15 percent. Places
with favorable life expectancy effects tend to have higher quality and quantity of health care, less
extreme climates, lower crime rates, and higher socioeconomic status. The large role the authors
estimate for health capital (individual behaviors) is consistent with conventional wisdom, but the
results also show that there is a substantial causal impact of place-based factors that conventional
health modeling approaches may underestimate. Using Hurricane Katrina as a natural experiment,
Deryugina and Molitor (2020) track Medicare survivors who were displaced by Hurricane Katrina.
Those who moved to higher-mortality regions experienced higher mortality rates than those who
moved to lower-mortality regions.
A growing literature cites the importance of community-based health departments and centers.
Hoehn-Velasco (2018) describes the role of community health departments on rural infant mor-
tality in the early 20th century and finds decreased infant mortality because of community health
departments. Hoehn-Velasco (2020) finds improved later-life outcomes due to early exposure to
public health programs. Bailey and Goodman-Bacon (2015) examine the expansion of community
health centers (CHCs) in the United States. They note that access to primary care has long-term
health benefits, even for those with near full-coverage insurance. The authors find that the CHCs
themselves are responsible for a two percent reduction in age-adjusted mortality rates for those
fifty years and older.
In general, the approach surrounding place-based healthcare studies falls in line with studies
of place-based policies in general.10 One potential policy initiative to increase positive outcomes
10Bartik (2020), for example, recently discusses the potential benefits associated with place-based job policies and
the need for greater targeting of distressed areas.
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in rural areas is increasing access to more urbanized areas. These urban areas arguably offer more
amenities and opportunities to potentially increase the quality of life of rural residents. Greenberg
(2016) emphasizes the importance of place-based, sub-county initiatives for poverty alleviation in
Appalachia. Partridge and Rickman (2008) suggest that one potential policy for alleviating poverty
in rural counties in the United States could be by increasing access through road construction. The
current work directly evaluates the impact of a large, transportation place-based policy in terms of
mortality outcomes.
3.1.3 Quantifying Impact of Roads
This work also fits broadly into the literature quantifying the various impacts of roads in the United
States and throughout the world. Chandra and Thompson (2000) examine the relationship between
highway spending and economic activity. Interestingly, this paper finds that highways have differ-
ent impacts across industries and across counties. New highways are associated with growth in
industries that can benefit from the reduced transportation costs, and shrinkage in some industries
because of the reallocation of economic activity along the highway. From a spatial perspective,
this paper finds that new highways raise the level of economic activity in the counties they pass
through while drawing activity away from adjacent counties, essentially having a zero net effect
on regional economic activity. This paper assumes that new highways are an exogenous shock to
the non-metropolitan counties that they run through, and uses a simple linear fixed effects model to
conduct its empirical analysis. Although this assumption may hold true for many places across the
country, in Appalachia particularly, the use of federal funds to construct highways in rural counties
is not exogenous. Rogers and Marshment (2000) also attempt to quantify the impact of highway
bypasses on small town retail sales. The authors examine the impact of highways bypassing small
towns using a difference-in-differences analysis, finding no significant impact of bypasses on local
retail sales.
Newer empirical contributions to this literature attempt to overcome the endogeneity problems
associated with highway placement: areas showing more population growth, income growth, or
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employment growth may have more highways or may attract new highway openings more than
a comparable control group. Therefore, estimates of the “true” effect of highways on any of the
before-mentioned outcome variables could be upwardly biased. Rephann and Isserman (1994)
find that the counties that benefited the most from interstate highways are those counties that had
a highway route pass directly through them and were in close proximity to an urban area; these
areas saw significant growth in their populations. Counties that bordered “interstate” counties or
rural counties exhibited few positive direct effects from highway construction.
Several papers use old highway plans that were never utilized as instruments for current high-
way placement; these old maps meet both the relevance and exclusion properties of a valid instru-
ment variable. After using a 1947 highway map plan to instrument for current highways, Baum-
Snow (2007) finds one new highway passing through a central city reduces its population by about
18 percent. Using old highway plans as an instrument, Michaels (2008) identifies the labor mar-
ket effects of the reduced trade barriers associated with the construction of the interstate highway
system; it shows that counties where the interstate highway system passed through experienced an
increase in trade-related activities, such as trucking and retail sales.11
There are also many papers that examine the impact of roads in developing countries.12 The
results from these papers generally do not find as large of an impact of roads on various outcome
variables as do the studies that focus on cities in the United States. For example, Asher and
Novosad (2020) study the impact of rural roads in India. Due to the institutional nature of the
Prime Minister’s Village Road Program, this paper is able to tease out the causal effect of road
construction on various development outcomes. Using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design,
this paper finds no significant impact of roads causing development in remote Indian villages. The
paper does point to evidence that the main effect of rural roads in India is allowing farmers access
to non-farm employment opportunities.
11More recent papers using old highway maps as instruments in a U.S. setting include Duranton and Turner (2011),
Duranton and Turner (2012), and Duranton et al. (2014).
12For example, see Hsu and Zhang (2014) and Baum-Snow et al. (2017).
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3.1.4 General Analysis of ARC Policies
A plethora of books and reports published over the past several decades highlight the successes
(and non-successes) of ARC policies in the Appalachian region. Bradshaw (1992), for example,
discusses the successes and failures of ARC in its first 25 years in existence, highlighting the
political influences on the direct contributions and goals of the commission in its early years.
Widner (1990) summarizes key statistics from ARC’s first 25 years, citing improved incomes,
health, and employment in the region. Several other technical reports cite the decline of poverty
(Black & Sanders, 2004), rise in standards of living (Black & Sanders, 2007), and increases in
educational attainment (Haaga, 2004) due to ARC involvement in the Appalachian region. On the
other hand, Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008) are hesitant to call ARC outright effective, noting that
finding the true effect of the ARC separate from all other simultaneous policy interventions may
never clearly present itself in the data.
More recent empirical papers have examined the impacts of ARC policies and funding with-
out specific attention to highway funding. Isserman and Rephann (1995) provide one of the first
major empirical analyses of the effects of the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) on the
391 counties that were in Appalachia at the time of the study. Using matching methods, this pa-
per finds that Appalachia grew significantly faster than did the control group in income, earnings,
population, and per capita income. This paper, in additional to the empirical contribution, also
provides an extensive historical background on the ARC and criticisms the commission has re-
ceived. Sayago-Gomez, Piras, Jackson, and Lacombe (2018) find that, after using matching meth-
ods, counties that received ARC funding grew faster than control counties in terms of per capita
income and employment from 1970 to 2012. D. Grossman, Humphreys, and Ruseski (2019), using
difference-in-differences, examine the effect of water, sewage, and sanitation-related ARC invest-
ment projects on individual outcomes like the presence of complete indoor plumbing and running
water in dwellings.
Beyond general reports published by the ARC and other empirical contributions concerning
non-highway ARC impacts, the analysis of rural roads in Appalachia has some limited empiri-
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cal footholds. Apart from Jaworski and Kitchens (2019), a relatively comprehensive and rigorous
analysis of the impact of the ADHS, one component of total ARC projects, has not been thoroughly
studied in the literature. Quantifying the impact of this rural highway network on mortality out-
comes in the Appalachian region contributes to several bodies of literature simultaneously, adding
to our understanding of the possible unintended consequences of this federal road building project
in the United States.
3.2 Primary Data Sources
3.2.1 Data Creation: Appalachian Development Highway System (1965-2018)
Although the history and progress of the ADHS has been tracked extensively by state and federal
agencies, a usable data set capable of being manipulated by statistical or GIS software is not pub-
licly available. Newly digitized maps were created to determine what states and counties received
a new section of the ADHS and when that section’s construction was completed. PDFs and scans
of historical maps, similar to Figure 3.1a, were collected from the mid-1960s to the present. After
digitizing these maps over time using QGIS, a manipulable data set tracking the construction of
road segments can be utilized to explore various outcome variables.13 The result of this process is
a dynamic representation of the ADHS construction, similar to Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2 displays the progress of ADHS construction from 1968 until 2017. The black lines
in each figure show the existing road network at the beginning of the time period and the red lines
show the construction progress over the length of the decade. Most of the construction occurred
between 1968 and 1978.
13The exact opening dates of the road segments are unknown. It is possible that the road segments could have
been open to traffic before construction was officially completed. However, the current empirical strategy hopes to
overcome this by examining medium- to long-run mortality outcomes.
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3.2.2 NVSS: NCHS Restricted-Use Mortality Files (1968-2017)
The main objective of this paper is to isolate the causal effect of the ADHS on mortality outcomes
in the Appalachian region. The National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), through the National
Vital Statistics System (NVSS), has data on mortality outcomes in the United States. This sample
starts from 1968 and continues to 2017. Restricted-use vital statistics are used to track the number
of deaths in Appalachian counties over time.14 This restricted-use data set is particularly informa-
tive because it not only has the location of residence and death, but also has the specific cause of
death, as indicated by International Classification of Diseases (ICD) codes, for every individual in
the data. This fact can be utilized to isolate the causes of death where quick access to healthcare
could have played a role in preventing premature death.
Throughout the length of the mortality data (1968-2017), the ICD codes went through three
revisions, essentially changing the way causes of death were coded in the data. Appendix Table
C.1 shows the changes in the ICD code system over time and lists what ICD codes translate to each
broad cause of death that will be analyzed in this study.
Figure 3.3 depicts Appalachian death trends over the length of the sample using the consistent
death definitions described in Appendix Table C.1. The top left panel shows all-cause deaths in the
Appalachian region have increased over time. Other causes of death vary in their trends throughout
time. Changes in mortality at the county level are shown in Figure 3.4. Darker shades of blue
represent decreases in mortality rates over the decade, white represents relatively no change, and
orange shades represent increases in mortality rates. Figure 3.5 isolates the change in heart disease
mortality over time and Figure 3.6 shows total accident mortality rate changes. Other causes of
death mapped over time can be found in Appendix C.
14The public-use data sets do not include fine geographic indicators for place of birth, residence or death beyond
1988. This is why restricted-use data is used.
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All model specifications will use case-specific mortality rates as outcome variables. Specifi-




∗ (100, 000) (3.1)
where m is the case-specific mortality rate in county i in year y, N is the number of deaths from
a specific cause in county i in year y, and C is the total population of county i in year y.15 This
rate is multiplied by 100,000 to express the rate as a whole number: deaths per 100,000 people.
Expressing deaths as a rate per 100,000 controls for high population levels that may be driving
mortality outcomes.
3.3 Method and Identification Strategy
3.3.1 Endogeneity Concerns of ADHS Segment Construction
Construction of segments of the ADHS was not randomly determined across space. The PARC set
out specific guidelines that the ARC used to determine what areas of the country, more specifically
what areas of Appalachia, were in need of more access to markets, employment opportunities, and
health care options. The PARC map places road segments in these areas of Appalachia. However,
the actual timing of the segments’ opening varies across time. Places that were arguably more
“remote” in the eyes of the federal government potentially saw construction and completion of
road segments sooner than other areas of Appalachia. On the other hand, areas isolated due to
the mountainous terrain could have potentially seen construction and completion of segments at
later dates compared to areas with more level terrain. Either way, this non-random assignment of
both potential and actual segment allocation and construction over time could lead to potentially
15Estimates of county-level intercensal populations from 1970-2014 are available from Roth (2016). 1970 popula-
tion estimates were used to proxy for 1968 and 1969 population. 2014 population estimates were used to proxy for
2015-2017 populations.
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biased estimates of the impact of the ADHS. Unfortunately, this concern has not been considered
in empirical studies until very recently.
To overcome this potential bias, an instrumental variable approach will be used to instrument
for the location of ADHS segments.
3.3.2 Instrumental Variable Approach
Construction of the ADHS will be instrumented with the original PARC plan for Appalachian
highway construction. This plan can be seen in Figure 3.1a.
Notably, this original plan is much smaller than what the ADHS has eventually become. One
can argue that this instrument is both relevant and excludable. The PARC highway plan, devel-
oped in 1964, was never officially utilized once construction of the ADHS began. Between the
initial development of the PARC highway plan and the creation of ARC, many counties that were
not originally considered to be possible recipients of federal funding for highways were added to
the definition of the “Appalachian” region. Therefore, the highway plans were redrawn after the
creation of ARC. The original PARC plan has been digitized using QGIS’s geo-referencing tools
as shown in Figure 3.1b. A comparison of the 1964 PARC plan versus a plan created in 1966 after
the formation of ARC is shown in Figure 3.7.16 Although relatively similar in the general route-
planning aspects, the 1966 plan was created after the guarantee of federal funds. This, plus the
addition of several parts of the country into the Appalachian region, rendered Figure 3.1a obsolete.
It is important to point out another characteristic of Figure 3.7 that informs the predicted sign of
the first stage relationship in Equation 3.2. Even though the two plans shown are generally similar
in terms of the highway system as a whole, decade to decade changes in a county centroid distance
to the 1964 PARC plan is constant over time, while actual construction of the ADHS segments is
completed in smaller chunks. Therefore, if a county was planned to get a route relatively close
to its centroid in the 1964 plan, the distance measure would be a small length. If, following the
suggestions of the 1964 plan (and subsequent later plans), that same county received an ADHS
16The original 1966 plan is shown in Appendix Figure C.2.
77
segment when there were no other segments that were generally close to that county constructed
up until then, then there will be a large change in the distance to an ADHS segment. In other
words, small distances to the 1964 plan are likely to translate to large, negative distance changes to
actual ADHS construction. If this line of logic holds, then one should expect a negative first stage
relationship.
Formally, the first stage relationship takes the following form:
∆ADHScd = α + φ1PARC1964c + β1Xcd + εcd, (3.2)
where ∆ADHScd stands for the change in county centroid distance to nearest ADHS road segment
across a given decade, PARC1964c stands for county centroid distance to nearest planned PARC
highway segment. Subscript c represents county-level data. d stands for the decade across which
the changes in ADHS and mortality rates are examined. There are five decade changes examined:
1968-1978, 1978-1988, 1988-1998, 1998-2008, and 2008-2017.17 X is a vector of county-level
controls added in fully specified equations. These controls are described in Section III.c. The
second testable hypothesis is whether or not exogenous increases in ADHS construction locations
have consequences on mortality rate outcomes. This is estimated in Equation 3.3:
∆MortalityRatecd = θ + β1 ̂∆ADHScd + β2Xcd + ucd, (3.3)
where ∆ ̂ADHSc stands for the fitted values from estimating Equation 3.2. β1 is the coefficient of
interest. Meeting additional assumptions of independence, SUTVA, and monotonicity, β1 repre-
sents the local average treatment effect (LATE).
SUTVA Concerns – The stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) requires treated units
to be only impacted by the treatment the unit was assigned, not the treatment assignment of sur-
rounding units. This assumption could potentially not hold when geographic units are considered;
17The last “decade” is only nine years instead of ten due to mortality data availability.
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geographic units may be impacted not only by the treatment they receive but the treatment of
neighboring geographic units. In the context of this research design, there could be potential spa-
tial spillovers of mortality outcomes into neighboring counties when there is an ADHS segment in
one county, even if the neighboring counties did not receive an ADHS segment themselves.
A common solution to contain potential spillovers of treatment is to aggregate to a higher
spatial unit (Duranton, Henderson, & Strange, 2015). Papers typically aggregate up from county
level analyses to MSA level to contain potential spillovers if SUTVA concerns exist (Duranton &
Turner, 2011). To address SUTVA concerns, Jaworski and Kitchens (2019) examine entire changes
to road network travel times to address SUTVA concerns.18
3.3.3 Potential Threats to Internal Validity
To pin down the mechanism of increased healthcare accessibility through the ADHS construction,
additional controls are arguably necessary to confirm the internal validity of the estimation tech-
niques used. In other words, to be confident that the estimations yield unconfounded estimates,
one would have to control for factors that both reduce mortality and occur relatively at the same
time as an ADHS segment’s opening.
The following subsections discuss additional data used to aid in confirming the proposed mech-
anism.
Hospital Density – The county-level density of hospitals is a potentially confounding variable:
a higher density of hospitals may be correlated with mortality outcomes in a county. This cor-
relation exists regardless of ADHS construction in a county, so not including this control will
overestimate the impact of the ADHS. As of 2020, there were 643 hospitals open in Appalachia.19
Unfortunately, a data set with both the exact geographic (lat/long) location, as well as the opening
dates/closing dates of hospitals does not exist. So, tracking these 643 hospitals over time is impos-
18Future extensions of this work will address potential SUTVA violations.
19These hospital locations are shown in Appendix Figure C.7. Source: https://hifld-geoplatform
.opendata.arcgis.com/datasets/hospitals
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sible; it is also unknown how many hospitals that were open earlier in the sample have closed, and
therefore, not counted in the current data.
To remedy this problem, County Business Patterns (CBP) data from the U.S. Census will be
utilized. The CBP data include a measure of the number of hospital establishments at the county
level. This measure can be used to control for existing health care facilities in a particular county.20
21 These data are available for Appalachian counties for the entire length of the sample period:
1968-2017.22
Figure 3.8a shows that the number of hospitals in Appalachia did fluctuate over the length of
the sample. Even though it appears that the number of hospitals began to decline after 1990, the
number of counties with hospitals steadily increased, as shown in Figure 3.8b. At the start of the
sample, less than half of counties in Appalachia had at least one hospital. By the end of the sample,
almost all counties had at least one hospital.
Simultaneous Federal Development Projects – ADHS construction was not the only form of
federal development investment occurring in Appalachia during this time period. Administrative
data on ARC-funded projects from 1968-2016 is used to control for simultaneous development
projects that may have impacted the health outcomes of Appalachian residents. These data include
the type of development project, as well as the states and/or counties to which they were targeted.23
As shown in Figure 3.9, there was a large spike in both total ARC investment, as well as just
health-related investment projects between 1968 and 1978. After this time, investment projects of
all types decreased and remained relatively constant after 1988. In fully specified models, a sum of
the number of health-related investment projects at the county level over a decade is used to proxy
for potentially simultaneous federally funded health improvements in the region.
20Bailey and Goodman-Bacon (2015) has detailed Community Health Center (CHC) data, but not hospital data.
21Hospital SIC code: 8062; NAICS code: 622110
22Source: https://catalog.archives.gov/search?f.ancestorNaIds=613576&q=*:
*&sort=naIdSort%20asc
23A list of the types of development projects can be found in Appendix Table C.2.
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Existing Road Density – Additionally, the existing road density could play a role in determining
the relative impact of the ADHS. Existing roads could have also increased the accessibility to
healthcare facilities in the Appalachian region regardless of ADHS construction. To control for
these other roads to isolate the effect of the ADHS on mortality rates, a control for the existing
1960 road density is added to fully specified models.24
3.4 IV Results: ADHS and Heterogeneous Impacts Across Time
The following subsections describe the IV results of estimating the two-step process described in
Equations 3.2 and 3.3. To summarize, the ADHS’s impact on mortality outcomes depend both on
the time period examined and the cause of death of interest. In all specifications and decades exam-
ined, there is a significant, negative, first-stage relationship between a county centroid’s distance
to the 1964 PARC plan and that county’s change in distance to an ADHS segment. Cumulative
summary statistics by decade can be found in Table 3.1. Results for additional mortality outcomes
can be found in Appendix C.1. All 2SLS models without controls can be found in Appendix C.2.
Total Mortality – 2SLS results with added controls for ARC health investment projects, count
of hospital establishments, and historic road density are shown in Table 3.2. Panels A-E represent
different decades of analysis. The F-statistic is above 10 in all decades, except 2008-2017 in Panel
E. Robustness checks in the next section account for potentially biased standard error calculations
due to the weak instrument. In all decades, there is not a significant relationship between total
mortality and construction of the ADHS.
Heart Disease – 2SLS results with added controls are shown in Table 3.3. Again, there is a
consistently significant first stage result. In Panels B and D, a large change in county centroid
distance to an ADHS segment is associated with lower rates of heart disease mortality between
24Data on 1960 road density comes from Jaworski and Kitchens (2019). Appendix Figure C.8 shows the road
network in 1960, before the construction of the ADHS. The length of the historic road network is calculated at the
county level.
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1978-1988 as well as 1998-2008. In other words, in those decades, a county centroid being closer
to an ADHS segment caused a significant reduction in heart disease deaths. This result supports
the proposed mechanism of the ADHS causing increased accessibility to healthcare facilities. The
decreases in heart disease mortality, however, are relatively small compared to the sample average
changes shown in column 1 of Table 3.3.
A possible explanation for the dissipation of results over time concerns the hospital density
variable. Counties with at least one hospital became more prevalent over the course of the sample,
as shown in Figure 3.8b. The fact that more counties were receiving hospitals in the 1988-1998
time period would explain why the distance to the ADHS did not matter as much to heart disease
mortality. If a county that never had a hospital finally received one, people would no longer have
to cross county borders to reach a hospital, which is what the ADHS helped facilitate. During the
1998-2008 time period, the large decrease in the number of hospitals in the Appalachian region
could explain the return of statistical significance of the ADHS again.
Hypertension – 2SLS results with added controls are shown in Table 3.4. The only decade with
significant results is 1988-1998, displayed in Panel C. Just like heart disease, there is a negative
relationship between mortality and distance to the ADHS, suggesting that the ADHS caused a
decrease in hypertension deaths between 1988 and 1998. This is an interesting result given the
general mortality rate in the Appalachian region associated with hypertension was increasing dur-
ing this time, as shown in Figure 3.3c and in column 1 of Table 3.4.
Total Accidents/Trauma – Table 3.5 displays the two-stage results for accident death rates in
Appalachia. In earlier decades of the sample, there is no significant relationship between ADHS
and accident mortality rates. However, in the last two decades of the sample, as shown in Panels D
and E, there is a positive, significant second stage relationship: as a county centroid got closer to
an ADHS segment, the larger accident mortality rates became in the 2000s. This is in contrast to
the negative and significant relationship estimated in the reduced form models in the same decades.
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The increase in accident mortality between 2008-2017 is equivalent to a 0.93 standard deviation
increase in the accident mortality change compared to the sample mean.
The total accident outcome includes a wide breadth of possible causes of death. Accident rates
in all decades include car accidents, so this could be a potential mechanism for the positive and
significant second stage results in later decades. As the ADHS was constructed over time, more and
more drivers took advantage of the roads. This increased demand for road usage over time could
have potentially led to an increase in car accident mortality rates. Additionally, greater access
to larger urban areas could also lead to an increase in accidental drug and medicinal overdoses.
Further disaggregation into these two more specific outcomes – car accidents and overdoses – is
shown in the following section.
3.5 Robustness and Mechanism
The following subsections discuss robustness exercises conducted.
Disaggregation of Total Accidents – In the previous section, the analysis of accident mortality
rates includes all accidental deaths. These causes of death range from car accidents, to falls and
poisonings. To add further weight to the proposed mechanism, two types of accidents are examined
separately: car accidents and overdoses. Figure 3.10 displays the mortality rates for car accidents
and accidental overdoses. Independently, these types of accidental deaths may have some associ-
ated with decreased distance to an ADHS road segment. If more people use the highway system,
over time, one would expect to see an increase in car accident mortality rates. However, as shown
in Table 3.6, this does not seem to be the case.
In terms of overdose deaths, one could expect to see counties that became closer to the ADHS
over time had increased access to larger, urban areas.25 With the potential for income and em-
ployment also comes increased access to more negatively associated aspects of city life. In fully
25For example, Corridor H, when completed, will connect interior West Virginia to the Washington, D.C. metro
area. Source: http://www.wvcorridorh.com/route/route.html
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specified IV models, shown in Table 3.7, there is a positive and statistically significant coefficient
for overdose mortality in the last three decades of the sample: counties that got closer to ADHS
segments experienced a significant increase in overdose mortality rates.26 In the last decade of the
sample, the increase in the change in overdose mortality estimated is equivalent to a 0.80 standard
deviation increase.
Corrections for Weak Instrument – In all of the 2SLS specifications for 2008-2017 discussed
in Section IV, the F-statistic testing for weak identification was below 10, a signal that the in-
strument is considered “weak.” This could be driven by the fact that the ADHS was practically
completed by this time, so few areas of Appalachia experienced large changes, if any changes at
all, in the distance to an ADHS segment. Panel E in Tables 3.5 and 3.7 include Anderson-Rubin
(AR) confidence sets for the second stage point estimate.27 Andrews, Stock, and Sun (2019) note
that AR confidence sets are efficient for just-identified models.
In Panel E of the above-mentioned tables for total mortality, heart disease, total accidents,
and overdose mortality outcomes, the significant second-stage coefficient in the 2008-2017 decade
does not appear to be driven by a statistically weak instrument. The coefficients fall between
the two-step confidence set proposed; this suggests that the significant relationships found in the
2008-2017 decade for total accidents and overdoses is not due to a relatively weak instrument.
Cumulative Effect of the ADHS on Mortality – The main results presented in Section 3.4 are a
set of repeated cross-sections. The cumulative effect of the ADHS on various mortality outcomes
can be estimated by pooling the results across the entire length of the sample. Formally, the panel
2SLS approach takes the following form, with Equation 3.4 the first stage and Equation 3.5 the
second stage:
ADHScy = α + φ1PARC1964c ∗ γy + β1Xcy + γy + δs + εcys, (3.4)
26In terms of comparability across time, the mortality data does not track what specific drugs or medicines were the
cause of overdose deaths.
27Appendix Tables C.2.1, C.2.2, and C.2.8 also include the adjusted confidence sets.
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where ADHScd stands for the county centroid distance to nearest ADHS road segment across a
given decade, PARC1964c stands for county centroid distance to nearest planned PARC highway
segment. In this panel setting, the PARC distance is interacted with a year fixed effect to allow the
instrument to be time-varying. Subscript c represents county-level data. y stands for the year in
which mortality rates and distances are examined. X is a vector of county-level controls added.28
In the panel setting, year fixed effects (γy) and state fixed effects (δs) are employed.
MortalityRatecy = θ + β1 ̂ADHScy + β2Xcy + γy + δs + ucys, (3.5)
where ̂ADHSc stands for the fitted values from estimating Equation 3.4. β1 is the coefficient of
interest.
Appendix Table C.3.1 reports the total effect of the ADHS across the entire length of the sam-
ple. Select causes of death are examined: total mortality, heart disease mortality, hypertension
mortality, total accident mortality, and accidental overdose mortality. All second stage F-statistics
are above 10. Although marginally significant results are found for certain causes of death, overall
it appears the cumulative impact of the ADHS on mortality was minimal. Decade-to-decade ex-
aminations of the ADHS, however, yield a deeper story of the relationship between the ADHS and
mortality.
County of Residence – In Appalachia over the sample, counties appear to have more mobile
residents. This is explicitly shown in Figure 3.11. Every death in the data has an indicator for both
county of death and county of residence. Therefore, one can get a sense if an Appalachian county
is home to a large share of people who died outside of the county in a given year. If the total count
of deaths occurring in a “county of residence” in county i is larger than the deaths categorized as
a “county of death” in county i, more residents died outside of the county compared to those that
28These controls are the same used in Section 3.4: count of hospitals in a county, number of ARC investment
projects in a county, and the existing 1960 road density.
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died within the county.29 Over time, Appalachian counties increasingly saw more residents dying
outside of the county of residence. This is suggestive evidence that Appalachian residents became
more mobile during the ADHS construction time period.
Unobservable Changes in Health Inputs – One limitation of the current analysis is the inability
to account for unobserved historical changes in health inputs. The construction of the ADHS im-
plies many simultaneous connections: connections to urban areas increase wealth and employment
opportunities in addition to reducing travel times. The current estimation does not seek to directly
estimate these benefits. However, there have been estimates of the benefits to the Appalachian
region caused by the ADHS, as shown by Economic Development Research Group (2017); these
benefits will be utilized more in the following section. Additionally, over the course of the sample,
quality of care improvements or mortality-prevention activities by individuals go unobserved.
3.6 Benefit-Cost Analysis
Using the estimates discussed in Section 3.4, calculations of the relative benefits and costs of
the ADHS are examined below. For each cause of death, the additional increase or decrease in
mortality caused by the ADHS can be translated into fewer or greater deaths in the Appalachian
region.
Heart Disease Lives Saved – As shown in Table 3.3, there was a significant decrease in heart
disease mortality between 1978-1988 as well as between 1998-2008. To calculate the lives saved
by the ADHS, the decrease in the heart disease mortality rate can be converted to reflect the num-
ber of lives saved in Appalachia. The average population across Appalachian in the 1978-1988
time period was 21.371 million people.30 With a decreased death rate of 2.974 per 100,000, this
29For example, if county i had 1000 deaths in the county of residence measure and 800 deaths in the county of death
measure, county i had more people’s deaths occur outside of the county compared to deaths that occurred inside of the
county.
30Figure C.9 shows the intercensal population estimates of Appalachia from 1970-2014. Population in 1978:
21.1531 million, population in 1988: 21.6101 million.
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corresponds to 636 fewer deaths in the Appalachian region due to heart disease between 1978-
1988.31 Between 1998 and 2008, the average Appalachian population was 23.961 million resi-
dents.32 With a decreased death rate of 4.132 per 100,000, this corresponds to 990 fewer deaths in
the Appalachian region due to heart disease between 1998-2008 because of the ADHS.
In total, because of the ADHS, 1626 fewer Appalachian residents died due to heart disease over
the length of the sample.
Hypertension Lives Saved – Table 3.4 shows there was a significant decrease in hypertension
mortality between 1988 and 1998. The mean Appalachian population during this time period was
22.327 million people.33 106 fewer people in the Appalachian region did not die of hypertension
between 1988 and 1998 due to the ADHS.
In sum, 1732 fewer people died in the Appalachian region of heart disease or hypertension
because of the ADHS.
Overdose Lives Lost – Although there were fewer lives lost to heart-related conditions, there
were more lives lost to accidental overdoses because of the ADHS, as shown in Panels D and E of
Table 3.7. Between 1998 and 2008, the average population of the Appalachian region was 23.961
million people.34 With an increased death rate of 0.920 per 100,000, this corresponds to 220 more
deaths in the Appalachian region due to accidental overdoses between 1998-2008. Between 2008
and 2017, the 15.622 per 100,000 increased death rate can be interpreted as 3933 more people who
died of accidental overdoses because of the ADHS.35
In sum, 4153 more people died in the Appalachian region of accidental overdoses because of
the ADHS.
31A mortality rate of 2.974 per 100,000 = 0.00002974 chance of one person dying. Out of a total of 21.371 million
people: 0.00002974 x 21371000 = 636 fewer deaths.
32Population in 1998: 23.043 million, population in 2008: 24.878 million.
33Population in 1988: 21.610 million, population in 1998: 23.043 million.
34Population of 1998: 23.043 million, population of 2008: 24.878 million.
35The average population of the Appalachian region between 2008 and 2017 was 25.178 million. Population in
2008: 24.878, population in 2015: 25.478.
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Benefit-Cost Analysis – Based on the findings above, there was a net increase in 2421 lives lost
in the Appalachian region due to the ADHS. This means 2.3 times more people died of overdose
deaths than those that were saved with heart disease or hypertension. To be able to compares
the financial costs and benefits of the ADHS, the “value of a statistical life” (VSL) will be used.
The VSL is a common measurement used in policy-informing research. The average value of a
statistical U.S. life is $10 million (Kniesner & Viscusi, 2019).36 This estimate can directly translate
as the willingness to pay for a small reduction in the probability of death. So, if an individual is
willing to pay $100 per year to reduce the probability of dying by 0.00001, then collectively a group
of 100,000 would be willing-to-pay $10 million per year to prevent the loss of one “statistical life”
(Colmer, 2020).
The previous subsections noted there was a net increase of 2421 deaths due to the ADHS in the
Appalachian region. In terms of the value of a statistical life, this would amount to $24.2 billion, in
addition to the direct construction costs of the ADHS. The construction costs of the current ADHS
has been estimated to be $11.2 billion; the remaining, unbuilt segments of the ADHS are estimated
to cost another $10.9 billion (Economic Development Research Group, 2017).37 The $24.2 billion
in unintended mortality consequences plus the $22.1 billion in past and future construction costs
brings the total cost of the ADHS to $46.3 billion.
As mentioned in the previous section, direct benefits of the ADHS are not calculated in this
paper. However, potential benefits of the ADHS include travel time savings, employment growth,
income growth, and increased domestic and international trade. Other health-related benefits not
calculated include preventative health measures taken by individuals in the Appalachian region.
According to a 2017 ARC report, the total benefits of the ADHS, quantified in transportation
cost savings and productivity gains to the Appalachian region, amount to $10.7 billion per year
(Economic Development Research Group, 2017). Over the 49 years of the sample period (1968-
2017), this amounts to approximately $524.3 billion cumulative benefits. Based on this estimation
36Estimate in 2017 dollars.
37About 90% of the ADHS has been constructed. The remaining 10% of the ADHS is being constructed in more
rugged terrains, which is why the price is significantly more per mile.
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of total benefits, it appears that, despite the total costs of the ADHS more than doubling with the
addition of unintended mortality consequences, the benefits of the ADHS outweigh the total costs.
3.7 Conclusion
The construction of the Appalachian Development Highway System (ADHS) was one of the largest
federally funded infrastructure projects in U.S. history. Using a newly digitized instrument, newly
digitized construction maps, and restricted vital statistics, this work contributes to the growing
economics literature connecting health outcomes to location-based attributes. This work has un-
covered an undocumented positive consequence of the ADHS – improved mortality outcomes of
time-sensitive conditions such as heart disease and hypertension. However, there is also evidence
of increased mortality rates in certain decades for certain causes of death, notably accidents; these
increases appear later in the sample and are driven by overdose mortality rates. Controlling for po-
tential confounding factors such as hospital density, simultaneous ARC health-related investment
projects, and existing 1960 road density does not diminish the IV results.
Although Appalachian mobility, in terms of county of death, appears to have increased over
the sample, various relationships that could have also changed given the construction of the ADHS
(quality of healthcare as well as individual wealth and employment) are not directly estimated in
this paper. Using simple benefit-cost analysis, the unintended mortality costs caused by the ADHS
are more than double the actual construction costs incurred. However, these increased costs do
not overtake previously calculated benefits of improved travel times, employment, and income
growth associated with the ADHS in the Appalachian region. Future extension of this work will
incorporate aggregated changes to the road network to address potential spillovers of accessibility
to neighboring counties.
While approaching internal validity, the current estimation approaches and research questions
considered do not touch much on external validity. The ADHS was a very unique federally funded
infrastructure project in the United States. Because this infrastructure stock now exists, another
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project at this scale is unlikely to be seen in the United States. However, in developing counties,
these results could be pertinent in cost-benefit analyses of large, infrastructure projects.
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Figure 3.1: 1964 President’s Appalachian Regional Commission (PARC) Highway Plan
Panel A: 1964 Original Map
Panel B: 1964 PARC Highway Plan Digitized
Note: Panel A shows the 1964 PARC highway plan map. Solid lines show the original plan for federally funded
highways in the region. This plan was never utilized after the creation of the Appalachian Regional Commission
(ARC) in 1965. New plans were drawn (See Figure C.2) after the guarantee of federal funding, as well as the expansion
of the Appalachian region into New York, Alabama, and Mississippi by 1967. Panel B is a digitized version of Panel
A, which shows the proposed highway segments in the PARC report as blue-dashed lines. Figure was digitized using
QGIS. Source for Panel A: PARC (1964). 91
Figure 3.2: Appalachian Development Highway System Progress: 1968-2017
Panel A: ADHS Progress 1968-1978 Panel B: ADHS Progress 1978-1988
Panel C: ADHS Progress 1988-1998 Panel D: ADHS Progress 1998-2008
Panel E: ADHS Progress 2008-2017
Note: Figures display construction progress of the Appalachian Development Highway System. In all Panels, black
lines represent highway segments already constructed at the start of the period. Red lines represent highway segments
completed in each time period. Figure created using QGIS.
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Figure 3.3: Appalachian Mortality Rates 1968-2017: Per 100,000
Panel A: Total Death Rate Panel B: Heart Disease Rate
Panel C: Hypertension Rate Panel D: Cerebrovascular Disease Rate
Panel E: Aortic Aneurysm Rate Panel F: Pneumonia & Influenza Rate
Panel G: Complications with Pregnancy Rate Panel H: Accident Rate
Note:: Appalachian death rates per 100,000 for various causes of death are shown above. Rates for county of death
graphed. 93
Figure 3.4: Appalachian County Change in Mortality Rates: 1968-2017
Panel A: Change in Total Mortality: 1968-1978 Panel B: Change in Total Mortality: 1978-1988
Panel C: Change in Total Mortality: 1988-1998 Panel D: Change in Total Mortality: 1998-2008
Panel E: Change in Total Mortality: 2008-2017
Note: Appalachian county changes in total mortality rates are shown above. Darker shades of blue represent nega-
tive changes (improved mortality over the decade), while darker shades of orange represent positive changes (worse
mortality over the decade). White counties represent no significant change. Counties grouped into equal quantiles per
decade. County of death mapped.
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Figure 3.5: Appalachian County Change in Heart Disease Mortality Rates: 1968-2017
Panel A: Change in Heart Disease Mortality:
1968-1978
Panel B: Change in Heart Disease Mortality:
1978-1988
Panel C: Change in Heart Disease Mortality:
1988-1998
Panel D: Change in Heart Disease Mortality:
1998-2008
Panel E: Change in Heart Disease Mortality:
2008-2017
Note: Appalachian county changes in heart disease mortality rates are shown above. Darker shades of blue represent
negative changes (improved mortality over the decade), while darker shades of orange represent positive changes
(worse mortality over the decade). White counties represent no significant change. Counties grouped into equal
quantiles per decade. County of death mapped.
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Figure 3.6: Appalachian County Change in Total Accident Mortality Rates: 1968-2017
Panel A: Change in Total Accident Mortality:
1968-1978
Panel B: Change in Total Accident Mortality:
1978-1988
Panel C: Change in Total Accident Mortality:
1988-1998
Panel D: Change in Total Accident Mortality:
1998-2008
Panel E: Change in Total Accident Mortality:
2008-2017
Note: Appalachian county changes in total accident mortality rates are shown above. Darker shades of blue represent
negative changes (improved mortality over the decade), while darker shades of orange represent positive changes
(worse mortality over the decade). White counties represent no significant change. Counties grouped into equal
quantiles per decade. County of death mapped.
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Figure 3.7: 1964 PARC Planned Highways vs. 1966 ADHS Planned Highways
Note: This map visually compares the PARC planned highways location compared to a later plan after the creation of
ARC. Figure was created using QGIS.
97
Figure 3.8: Hospitals in Appalachia over Time
Panel A: Count of Hospital Establishments
Panel B: Number of Counties with at Least One Hospital
Note: Panel A displays the count of hospitals in the Appalachian region over time. Panel B displays the number of
counties in Appalachia with at least one hospital.
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Figure 3.9: Count of ARC Investment Projects: 1968-2016
Note: Graph shows ARC investment projects from 1968-2016. The blue line shows the total count of ARC investment
projects, while the orange dashed line shows the total count of projects that explicitly cite “health” in the project
description.
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Figure 3.10: Disaggregating Total Accidents: Car Accidents and Overdoses
Panel A: Car Accident Mortality Rate
Panel B: Overdose Mortality Rate
Note: Panel A displays the car accident mortality rate in Appalachia. Panel B displays the accidental overdose
mortality rate in Appalachia.
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Figure 3.11: Proportion of Appalachian Counties with More Residents Dying Outside of the
County
Note: Graph shows the proportion of Appalachian counties that have larger share of “county of residence” (CR) deaths
compared to “county of death” (CD) deaths. In other words, this graph shows that more people in Appalachia over
time died in a county that is not their county of residence, adding evidence of increased mobility in the region.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics by Decade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean S.D. Min. Max. Count
Panel A: 1968-1978
Distance to ADHS 47.4 38.00 0.29 191.91 3840
Distance to PARC Plan 48.5 53.95 0.25 250.42 3840
Hospital Count 1.2 2.48 0.00 39.00 3840
ARC Health Projects 0.4 0.89 0.00 8.00 3758
1960 Road Miles 192631.3 118629.67 32593.95 761721.75 3840
Panel B: 1978-1988
Distance to ADHS 30.1 28.20 0.13 145.08 3916
Distance to PARC Plan 48.4 53.59 0.25 250.42 3916
Hospital Count 1.4 2.81 0.00 48.00 3916
ARC Health Projects 0.2 0.53 0.00 8.00 3821
1960 Road Miles 191554.0 117816.16 32593.95 761721.75 3916
Panel C: 1988-1998
Distance to ADHS 28.1 25.86 0.13 145.08 3970
Distance to PARC Plan 48.4 53.34 0.25 250.42 3970
Hospital Count 1.6 2.89 0.00 43.00 3970
ARC Health Projects 0.0 0.23 0.00 4.00 3870
1960 Road Miles 190806.3 117247.65 32593.95 761721.75 3970
Panel D: 1998-2008
Distance to ADHS 26.3 24.64 0.13 145.08 3970
Distance to PARC Plan 48.4 53.34 0.25 250.42 3970
Hospital Count 1.4 1.91 0.00 31.00 3964
ARC Health Projects 0.2 0.49 0.00 3.00 3870
1960 Road Miles 190806.3 117247.65 32593.95 761721.75 3970
Panel E: 2008-2017
Distance to ADHS 24.4 21.89 0.06 145.08 3961
Distance to PARC Plan 48.4 53.34 0.25 250.42 3970
Hospital Count 1.3 2.09 0.00 46.00 3970
ARC Health Projects 0.3 0.58 0.00 5.00 3870
1960 Road Miles 190806.3 117247.65 32593.95 761721.75 3970
Note: Summary statistics for the county-year level, separated by decade, are shown above.
Distance to ADHS is county centroid distance to nearest ADHS segment in miles. Distance to
PARC plan is county centroid distance to nearest PARC planned segment. 1960 road miles is
the total county road network in 1960 measured in miles.
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Table 3.2: 2SLS Estimates of Appalachian Development Highway System on Total Mortality
Rate With Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean ∆ Mortality Reduced Form 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Panel A: 1968-1978 ∆ in Total Mortality
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan 0.340 -0.207***
(0.709) (0.022)̂∆ADHS -161.263 -1.642
(954.674) (3.415)
Counties 396 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 91.28
Panel B: 1978-1988 ∆ in Total Mortality
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan 0.191 -0.102***
(0.274) (0.010)̂∆ADHS 37.413 -1.865
(402.965) (2.677)
Counties 396 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 103.81
Panel C: 1988-1998 ∆ in Total Mortality
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.248* -0.035***
(0.143) (0.009)̂∆ADHS 49.578 7.705
(158.240) (4.354)
Counties 406 406 406 406
Kleibergen-Paap F 14.76
Panel D: 1998-2008 ∆ in Total Mortality
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan 0.079 -0.041***
(0.143) (0.011)̂∆ADHS -12.176 -1.932
(234.105) (3.568)
Counties 427 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 13.67
Panel E: 2008-2017 ∆ in Total Mortality
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.304* -0.003***
(0.162) (0.001)̂∆ADHS 111.009 98.912
(235.044) (61.741)
Counties 427 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 8.13
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent variable is change in total mortality in Appalachia. Each panel,
A-E, shows the results for a different time period. Column 1 shows the mean change in total mortality, with standard
deviations in parentheses. Column 2 shows reduced form results (PARC distance on mortality), Column 3 shows first
stage results (PARC distance on ADHS distance), and Column 4 shows second stage results (instrumented ADHS distance
on mortality). Controls included in every panel are the count of hospital establishments in the last year of the decade, the
total number of health-related ARC investment projects over the decade at the county level, and the length of existing road
network in 1960 at the county level. County-clustered standard errors are used in every column and panel.
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Table 3.3: 2SLS Estimates of Appalachian Development Highway System on Heart Disease
Mortality Rate With Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean ∆ Mortality Reduced Form 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Panel A: 1968-1978 ∆ in Mortality
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.049 -0.207***
(0.161) (0.021)̂∆ADHS -45.110 0.234
(208.795) (0.775)
Counties 396 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 91.28
Panel B: 1978-1988 ∆ in Mortality
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan 0.304** -0.102***
(0.128) (0.010)̂∆ADHS -8.456 -2.974**
(182.499) (1.309)
Counties 396 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 103.81
Panel C: 1988-1998 ∆ in Mortality
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan 0.004 -0.035***
(0.066) (0.009)̂∆ADHS -27.219 -0.119
(77.396) (1.886)
Counties 406 406 406 406
Kleibergen-Paap F 14.76
Panel D: 1998-2008 ∆ in Mortality
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan 0.168** -0.040***
(0.068) (0.011)̂∆ADHS -65.146 -4.132**
(98.173) (1.978)
Counties 427 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 13.67
Panel E: 2008-2017 ∆ in Mortality
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.084 -0.003***
(0.063) (0.001)̂∆ADHS 2.984 27.157
(85.988) (23.015)
Counties 427 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 8.13
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent variable is change in heart disease mortality in Appalachia.
Each panel, A-E, shows the results for a different time period. Column 1 shows the mean change in heart disease
mortality, with standard deviations in parentheses. Column 2 shows reduced form results (PARC distance on mor-
tality), Column 3 shows first stage results (PARC distance on ADHS distance), and Column 4 shows second stage
results (instrumented ADHS distance on mortality). Controls included in every panel are the count of hospital estab-
lishments in the last year of the decade, the total number of health-related ARC investment projects over the decade
at the county level, and the length of existing road network in 1960 at the county level. County-clustered standard
errors are used in every column and panel. 104
Table 3.4: 2SLS Estimates of Appalachian Development Highway System on Hypertension
Mortality Rate With Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean ∆ Mortality Reduced Form 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Panel A: 1968-1978 ∆ in Mortality
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.007 -0.207***
(0.011) (0.022)̂∆ADHS -3.433 0.033
(14.555) (0.054)
Counties 396 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 91.28
Panel B: 1978-1988 ∆ in Mortality
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.001 -0.102***
(0.004) (0.010)̂∆ADHS 0.923 0.008
(5.223) (0.039)
Counties 396 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 103.81
Panel C: 1988-1998 ∆ in Mortality
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan 0.017** -0.035***
(0.007) (0.009)̂∆ADHS 1.694 -0.474**
(5.893) (0.216)
Counties 406 406 406 406
Kleibergen-Paap F 14.76
Panel D: 1998-2008 ∆ in Mortality
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan 0.000 -0.041***
(0.014) (0.010)̂∆ADHS 3.508 -0.002
(9.686) (0.357)
Counties 427 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 13.67
Panel E: 2008-2017 ∆ in Mortality
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.016 -0.003***
(0.014) (0.001)̂∆ADHS 2.723 5.280
(11.977) (4.890)
Counties 427 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 8.13
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent variable is change in hypertension mortality in Appalachia.
Each panel, A-E, shows the results for a different time period. Column 1 shows the mean change in hypertension
mortality, with standard deviations in parentheses. Column 2 shows reduced form results (PARC distance on mor-
tality), Column 3 shows first stage results (PARC distance on ADHS distance), and Column 4 shows second stage
results (instrumented ADHS distance on mortality). Controls included in every panel are the count of hospital estab-
lishments in the last year of the decade, the total number of health-related ARC investment projects over the decade
at the county level, and the length of existing road network in 1960 at the county level. County-clustered standard
errors are used in every column and panel. 105
Table 3.5: 2SLS Estimates of Appalachian Development Highway System on Accident Mortality
Rate With Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean ∆ Mortality Reduced Form 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Panel A: 1968-1978 ∆ in Mortality
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.003 -0.207***
(0.037) (0.022)̂∆ADHS -13.667 0.016
(47.674) (0.179)
Counties 396 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 91.28
Panel B: 1978-1988 ∆ in Mortality
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan 0.070 -0.102***
(0.051) (0.010)̂∆ADHS -9.333 -0.686
(62.190) (0.496)
Counties 396 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 103.81
Panel C: 1988-1998 ∆ in Mortality
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.027 -0.035***
(0.030) (0.009)̂∆ADHS -3.898 0.769
(23.430) (0.836)
Counties 406 406 406 406
Kleibergen-Paap F 14.76
Panel D: 1998-2008 ∆ in Mortality
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.068*** -0.041***
(0.020) (0.011)̂∆ADHS 7.073 1.666**
(29.025) (0.709)
Counties 427 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 13.67
Panel E: 2008-2017 ∆ in Mortality
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.093*** -0.003***
(0.023) (0.001)̂∆ADHS 15.812 30.343**
(32.603) (12.347)
Counties 427 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 8.13
Two-Step AR-CIs [14.454, 95.118]
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent variable is change in accident mortality in Appalachia. Each panel,
A-E, shows the results for a different time period. Column 1 shows the mean change in accident mortality, with standard
deviations in parentheses. Column 2 shows reduced form results (PARC distance on mortality), Column 3 shows first stage
results (PARC distance on ADHS distance), and Column 4 shows second stage results (instrumented ADHS distance on
mortality). Controls included in every panel are the count of hospital establishments in the last year of the decade, the
total number of health-related ARC investment projects over the decade at the county level, and the length of existing road
network in 1960 at the county level. County-clustered standard errors are used in every column and panel. Panel E includes
two-step Anderson-Rubin confidence interval. 106
Table 3.6: 2SLS Estimates of Appalachian Development Highway System on Car Accident
Mortality Rate With Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean ∆ Mortality Reduced Form 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Panel A: 1968-1978 ∆ in Mortality
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan 0.005 -0.207***
(0.012) (0.022)̂∆ADHS -0.974 -0.028
(12.675) (0.061)
Counties 396 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 91.28
Panel B: 1978-1988 ∆ in Mortality
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan 0.026 -0.102***
(0.020) (0.010)̂∆ADHS 18.177 -0.253
(19.350) (0.186)
Counties 396 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 103.81
Panel C: 1988-1998 ∆ in Mortality
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.003 -0.035***
(0.019) (0.009)̂∆ADHS -4.623 0.071
(16.572) (0.534)
Counties 406 406 406 406
Kleibergen-Paap F 14.76
Panel D: 1998-2008 ∆ in Mortality
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.001 -0.041***
(0.014) (0.011)̂∆ADHS -2.773 0.023
( 15.439) (0.347)
Counties 427 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 13.67
Panel E: 2008-2017 ∆ in Mortality
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan 0.026* -0.003***
(0.014) (0.001)̂∆ADHS -1.035 -8.295
(15.703) (5.417)
Counties 427 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 8.13
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent variable is change in car accident mortality in Appalachia.
Each panel, A-E, shows the results for a different time period. Column 1 shows the mean change in car accident
mortality, with standard deviations in parentheses. Column 2 shows reduced form results (PARC distance on mor-
tality), Column 3 shows first stage results (PARC distance on ADHS distance), and Column 4 shows second stage
results (instrumented ADHS distance on mortality). Controls included in every panel are the count of hospital estab-
lishments in the last year of the decade, the total number of health-related ARC investment projects over the decade
at the county level, and the length of existing road network in 1960 at the county level. County-clustered standard
errors are used in every column and panel. 107
Table 3.7: 2SLS Estimates of Appalachian Development Highway System on Accidental
Overdose Mortality Rate With Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean ∆ Mortality Reduced Form 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Panel A: 1968-1978 ∆ in Mortality
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan 0.001 -0.207***
(0.002) (0.022)̂∆ADHS 0.206 -0.003
(1.879) (0.010)
Counties 396 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 91.28
Panel B: 1978-1988 ∆ in Mortality
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.002 -0.102***
(0.004) (0.010)̂∆ADHS 1.434 0.026
(2.994) (0.035)
Counties 396 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 103.81
Panel C: 1988-1998 ∆ in Mortality
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.010*** -0.035***
(0.004) (0.009)̂∆ADHS 1.346 0.292**
(4.523) (0.125)
Counties 406 406 406 406
Kleibergen-Paap F 14.76
Panel D: 1998-2008 ∆ in Mortality
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.037*** -0.041***
(0.010) (0.011)̂∆ADHS 13.461 0.920**
(15.332) (0.362)
Counties 427 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 13.67
Panel E: 2008-2017 ∆ in Mortality
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.048*** -0.003***
(0.011) (0.001)̂∆ADHS 6.724 15.622**
(19.479) (6.356)
Counties 427 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 8.13
Two-Step AR-CIs [7.442, 50.228]
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent variable is change in accidental overdose mortality in Appalachia.
Each panel, A-E, shows the results for a different time period. Column 1 shows the mean change in overdose mortality,
with standard deviations in parentheses. Column 2 shows reduced form results (PARC distance on mortality), Column
3 shows first stage results (PARC distance on ADHS distance), and Column 4 shows second stage results (instrumented
ADHS distance on mortality). Controls included in every panel are the count of hospital establishments in the last year
of the decade, the total number of health-related ARC investment projects over the decade at the county level, and the
length of existing road network in 1960 at the county level. County-clustered standard errors are used in every column
and panel. Panel E includes two-step Anderson-Rubin confidence interval.108
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Table A.1: Trip and Driver Characteristics Before Matching: 50 miles or less
Control County Treated County Difference
Trip Characteristics
Time to Work 21.06 30.53 -20.59***
(0.30) (0.260) [0.00]
Short Commute 0.999 0.55 65.38***
(0.004) (0.004) [0.00]
Long Commute 0.001 0.45 -65.38***
(0.004) (0.004) [0.00]
Distance to work 22.12 20.39 -0.95
(2.00) (0.83) [0.17]
Driver Characteristics
Male driver 0.48 0.51 -3.57***
(0.006) (0.004) [0.00]
Female driver 0.52 0.49 3.57***
(0.006) (0.004) [0.00]
Less than high school 0.03 0.02 3.33***
(0.002) (0.001) [0.00]
Age 46.51 45.25 5.48***
(0.20) (0.12) [0.00]
Work Characteristics
Sales 0.25 0.21 6.23***
(0.006) (0.003) [0.00]
Manufacturing 0.14 0.09 9.46***
(0.004) (0.003) [0.00]
Number of trips 5,268 13,671
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Means for control and treated counties are shown above.
T-tests were used to test for the difference in means. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and
p-values are shown in brackets.
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Table A.2: Trip and Driver Characteristics After Matching: 50 miles or less
Control County Treated County Difference
Trip Characteristics
Time to Work 21.04 29.72 -17.55***
(0.30) (0.40) [0.00]
Short Commute 0.999 0.57 62.81***
(0.004) (0.007) [0.00]
Long Commute 0.001 0.43 -62.81***
(0.004) (0.007) [0.00]
Distance to work 14.34 17.32 -2.18***
(0.96) (0.97) [0.01]
Driver Characteristics
Male driver 0.48 0.48 0.00
(0.007) (0.007) [0.50]
Female driver 0.52 0.52 0.00
(0.007) (0.007) [0.50]
Less than high school 0.03 0.03 0.00
(0.002) (0.002) [0.50]
Age 46.46 46.45 0.02
(0.20) (0.20) [0.51]
Work Characteristics
Sales 0.25 0.25 0.57
(0.006) (0.006) [0.71]
Manufacturing 0.14 0.12 4.78***
(0.005) (0.004) [0.00]
Number of trips 5,210 5,210
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Means for control and treated counties are shown above.
T-tests were used to test for the difference in means. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and
p-values are shown in brackets.
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Table A.3: Trip and Driver Characteristics Before Matching: 25 miles or less
Control County Treated County Difference
Trip Characteristics
Time to Work 22.65 32.78 -24.70***
(0.32) (0.25) [0.00]
Short Commute 0.99 0.38 120.02***
(0.001) (0.005) [0.00]
Long Commute 0.001 0.62 -120.00***
(0.001) (0.004) [0.00]
Distance to work 20.38 21.32 -0.57
(1.36) (0.95) [0.28]
Driver Characteristics
Male driver 0.49 0.51 -2.43***
(0.01) (0.01) [0.01]
Female driver 0.51 0.49 2.43***
(0.01) (0.01) [0.01]
Less than high school 0.03 0.02 2.13***
(0.002) (0.002) [0.02]
Age 45.82 45.40 2.03***
(0.15) (0.14) [0.02]
Work Characteristics
Sales 0.24 0.20 6.98***
(0.004) (0.004) [0.00]
Manufacturing 0.13 0.09 7.46***
(0.003) (0.003) [0.00]
Number of trips 9,128 9,811
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Means for control and treated counties are shown above.
T-tests were used to test for the difference in means. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and
p-values are shown in brackets.
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Table A.4: Trip and Driver Characteristics After Matching: 25 miles or less
Control County Treated County Difference
Trip Characteristics
Time to Work 22.63 32.43 -23.12***
(0.26) (0.34) [0.00]
Short Commute 0.99 0.39 110.36***
(0.001) (0.005) [0.00]
Long Commute 0.006 0.61 -110.00***
(0.001) (0.054) [0.00]
Distance to work 13.88 17.81 -4.61
(0.59) (0.61) [0.00]
Driver Characteristics
Male driver 0.49 0.49 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) [0.50]
Female driver 0.51 0.51 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) [0.50]
Less than high school 0.03 0.03 0.00
(0.002) (0.002) [0.50]
Age 45.68 45.71 -0.14
(0.16) (0.16) [0.45]
Work Characteristics
Sales 0.24 0.20 2.29***
(0.005) (0.005) [0.00]
Manufacturing 0.12 0.10 2.80***
(0.004) (0.003) [0.00]
Number of trips 8,188 8,188
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Means for control and treated counties are shown above.
T-tests were used to test for the difference in means. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and
p-values are shown in brackets.
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Table A.5: Trip and Driver Characteristics Before Matching: 10 miles or less
Control County Treated County Difference
Trip Characteristics
Time to Work 24.04 33.09 -21.75***
(0.25) (0.35) [0.00]
Short Commute 0.92 0.35 104.23***
(0.003) (0.005) [0.00]
Long Commute 0.08 0.65 -100.00***
(0.003) (0.005) [0.00]
Distance to work 20.10 21.90 -1.09
(1.18) (1.08) [0.14]
Driver Characteristics
Male driver 0.49 0.51 -2.55***
(0.01) (0.01) [0.01]
Female driver 0.51 0.49 2.55***
(0.01) (0.01) [0.01]
Less than high school 0.03 0.02 2.84***
(0.002) (0.002) [0.02]
Age 45.77 45.36 1.94***
(0.14) (0.15) [0.02]
Work Characteristics
Sales 0.23 0.21 4.95***
(0.004) (0.004) [0.00]
Manufacturing 0.12 0.09 6.29***
(0.003) (0.003) [0.00]
Number of trips 10,866 8,073
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Means for control and treated counties are shown above.
T-tests were used to test for the difference in means. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and
p-values are shown in brackets.
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Table A.6: Trip and Driver Characteristics After Matching: 10 miles or less
Control County Treated County Difference
Trip Characteristics
Time to Work 24.22 32.74 -19.38***
(0.28) (0.34) [0.00]
Short Commute 0.92 0.35 90.92***
(0.003) (0.005) [0.00]
Long Commute 0.08 0.65 -90.92***
(0.003) (0.005) [0.00]
Distance to work 13.94 17.67 -4.90***
(0.53) (0.55) [0.00]
Driver Characteristics
Male driver 0.51 0.51 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) [0.50]
Female driver 0.49 0.49 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) [0.50]
Age 45.27 45.29 -0.09
(0.16) (0.16) [0.46]
Less than high school 0.02 0.02 0.00
(0.002) (0.002) [0.50]
Work Characteristics
Sales 0.21 0.20 1.00
(0.003) (0.003) [0.16]
Manufacturing 0.11 0.09 2.57***
(0.003) (0.003) [0.01]
Number of trips 7,856 7,856
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Means for control and treated counties are shown above.
T-tests were used to test for the difference in means. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and
p-values are shown in brackets.
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Table A.7: Trip and Driver Characteristics Before Matching: 5 miles or less
Control County Treated County Difference
Trip Characteristics
Time to Work 24.79 33.14 -19.58***
(0.24) (0.38) [0.00]
Short Commute 0.86 0.37 79.78***
(0.003) (0.006) [0.00]
Long Commute 0.14 0.63 -79.78***
(0.003) (0.006) [0.00]
Distance to work 20.96 20.71 0.14
(1.13) (1.08) [0.44]
Driver Characteristics
Male driver 0.49 0.51 -2.67***
(0.01) (0.01) [0.03]
Female driver 0.51 0.48 2.67***
(0.01) (0.01) [0.00]
Age 45.84 45.19 3.04***
(0.13) (0.16) [0.00]
Less than high school 0.03 0.02 2.88***
(0.002) (0.002) [0.00]
Work Characteristics
Sales 0.23 0.20 5.00***
(0.004) (0.005) [0.00]
Manufacturing 0.12 0.09 5.41***
(0.002) (0.003) [0.00]
Number of trips 11,889 7,050
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Means for control and treated counties are shown above.
T-tests were used to test for the difference in means. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and
p-values are shown in brackets.
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Table A.8: Trip and Driver Characteristics After Matching: 5 miles or less
Control County Treated County Difference
Trip Characteristics
Time to Work 25.15 32.92 -16.47***
(0.30) (0.36) [0.00]
Short Commute 0.85 0.37 66.99***
(0.004) (0.006) [0.00]
Long Commute 0.14 0.63 -66.99***
(0.004) (0.006) [0.00]
Distance to work 14.82 17.45 -3.14***
(0.58) (0.61) [0.00]
Driver Characteristics
Male driver 0.51 0.51 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) [0.50]
Female driver 0.49 0.49 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) [0.50]
Age 45.16 45.16 -0.03
(0.16) (0.16) [0.48]
Less than high school 0.02 0.02 0.00
(0.002) (0.002) [0.50]
Work Characteristics
Sales 0.21 0.20 1.50*
(0.005) (0.005) [0.06]
Manufacturing 0.10 0.09 1.57*
(0.004) (0.003) [0.06]
Number of trips 7,008 7,008
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Means for control and treated counties are shown above.
T-tests were used to test for the difference in means. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and
p-values are shown in brackets.
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Table A.9: Nearest Neighbor Matching Analysis
Average Treatment Effect Average Treatment Effect on the Treated
Binary Treatment 5.68*** 6.85***
(0.34) (0.36)
≤ 50 miles 7.91*** 8.83***
(0.31) (0.31)
≤ 25 miles 6.84*** 8.28***
(0.34) (0.34)
≤ 10 miles 5.19*** 6.81***
(0.34) (0.38)
≤ 5 miles 5.01*** 6.56***
(0.36) (0.39)
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Nearest neighbor average treatment effects and average treatment effects
on the treated are displayed for all HOV treatment definitions’ impacts on commute time. The four nearest neighbors
were used to calculate these effects. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
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Figure A.1: 1947 Interstate Highway Plan Digitized
Note: Figure displays the 1947 highway plan drawn by the U.S. House of Representatives (Figure 1.4) in its digitized
form. Figure only displays the plan’s lines drawn for California. Figure created using QGIS.
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Figure B.1: Pittsburgh Expenditures (2009-2017)
Note: Graph charts the expenditures on roads and road maintenance in the city of Pittsburgh for the length of the sam-
ple (2009-2017). The navy line represents total expenditures on highways and streets (construction, repair, etc.), while
the orange-dashed line represents the expenditures just on paving and resurfacing. Sources: Pittsburgh Comprehen-
sive Annual Financial Reports (https://pittsburghpa.gov/controller/cafr) and Pittsburgh Capital
Budgets (https://pittsburghpa.gov/council/capital-budgets)
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Figure B.2: Maintenance Projects and Roads Superimposed Above Political Wards
Note: This map of Pittsburgh shows the total universe of city-maintained roads and where maintenance occurred
during the sample period. The blue lines are all city-maintained roads, and the orange lines show segments where
maintenance occurred. Thick black lines denote ward boundaries.
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Figure B.3: Distribution of Political Alignment
Panel A: Within-Ward Alignment Cutoff
Panel B: Raw Republican Percentage Proportion
Note: N = 288 ward-year observations
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Figure B.4: Number of 1 Meter Road Segments by Distance to Ward Boundary
Note: 1 segment per year kept, because political alignment changes yearly.
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Figure B.5: Ward-Level Spatial RD Plots, Combining Tests and Falsification
Panel A: Mayoral Elections, June-August, Alignment
Change at Border
Panel B: Mayoral Elections, October, Alignment
Change at Border
Panel C: Non-Mayoral Elections, June-August,
Alignment Change at Border
Panel D: Non-Mayoral Elections, October,
Alignment Change at Border
Panel E: Mayoral Elections, June-August, Alignment
Same at Border
Panel F: Mayoral Elections, October, Alignment
Same at Border
Panel G: Non-Mayoral Elections, June-August,
Alignment Same at Border
Panel H: Non-Mayoral Elections, October,
Alignment Same at Border
Note: Panels D and H drop out national election years, 2012 and 2016. Blue dots are politically unaligned, red dots
are politically aligned. X-axis is distance to more politically aligned ward. Within 10 meters of boundary dropped due
to the likelihood they are exactly on the border.
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Figure B.6: The Cost of Road Maintenance Delays
Note: Exponential function extrapolated from two points which are noted in Burningham and Stankevich (2005). We
added a point at (0,1), because it is likely there is no extra cost from no delay. This reduces the R-squared from 1 to
0.9995.
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Table B.1: Federal Highway Administration State & Urbanized Area Statistics: Population over
750,000
Urban Area Variable Outside of Number of Republican
Two SD from Mean Mayors since 1960
New York Northeastern NJ, NY Urbanized Population ↑ 3
Los Angeles, CA Urbanized Population ↑ 2
Chicago - Northwestern IN, IL Federal-Aid Urbanized Land Area ↑ 0
Philadelphia, PA 0
San Francisco - Oakland, CA 1
Detroit, MI 1
Dallas - Ft. Worth, TX 4
Washington, DC 0
Atlanta, GA Daily Vehicle Miles per Capita ↑ 0
Boston, MA 0
San Diego, CA 8
Houston, TX Daily Vehicle Miles per Capita ↑ 2
Minneapolis - St. Paul, MN 2
Miami - Hialeah, FL Persons per Square Mile ↑ 6
Phoenix, AZ 7
Baltimore, MD 1
St. Louis, MO 0
Seattle, WA 1
Denver, CO 1
Tampa - St. Petersburg, FL % of Travel Served by Freeways ↓ 3
Cleveland, OH 2
San Jose, CA 0
Ft. Lauderdale - Hollywood, FL 1
Pittsburgh, PA 0
Milwaukee, WI 0
Norfolk - VA Beach - Newport News, VA 0
Kansas City, MO Total Freeway Miles per Urban Pop. ↑ 1
Sacramento, CA 0
Riverside - San Bernardino, CA 1
Portland - Vancouver, OR 1
San Juan, PR Daily Vehicle Miles per Capita ↓ NA
Las Vegas, NV 1
Cincinnati, OH 4
Orlando, FL 2
San Antonio, TX 1
Buffalo - Niagara Falls, NY 1
Oklahoma City, OK 5
New Orleans, LA Daily Vehicle Miles per Capita ↓ 0




Providence - Pawtucket, RI 0
Jacksonville, FL 3
Salt Lake City, UT 2
Louisville, KY 2
Tulsa, OK 7
Note: Urbanized areas in the United States with populations above 750,000 people, listed in order of pop-
ulation. ↑: two standard deviations above the mean of all cities listed ↓: two standard deviations below the
mean of all cities listed. Source: Federal Highway Administration (https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/
ohim/onh00/onh2p11.htm) Number of Republican mayors since 1960 measures the relative political
“competitiveness” of the cities on the list.
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Table B.2: Investigating Political Cycles on Car Crashes
More MaintenanceEntire IEPLess Maintenance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Oct Aug-Oct Jun-Oct Jun-Aug Jun
Panel A: Number of Crashes
IEP * PA 0.02 0.02 -0.04 -0.09** -0.02
(0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08)
Mean of Crashes 7.565
Panel B: People Involved in Crashes
IEP * PA 0.00 0.03 -0.05 -0.11* -0.03
(0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08)
Person Count Mean 18.49
Panel C: Count of Major Injuries
IEP * PA 0.98* 0.37 0.19 -0.19 -0.11
(0.51) (0.38) (0.27) (0.39) (0.37)
Mean of Major Injuries 0.160
Panel D: Heavy Truck Accidents
IEP * PA -0.12 -0.09 -0.34* -0.71** -0.26
(0.58) (0.24) (0.19) (0.28) (0.55)
Heavy Truck Accidents Mean 0.215
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Estimates are from Poisson conditional
fixed effect model, shown in Equation 2.1. Ward, month, and year (uninteracted)
fixed effects are included in every column. Standard errors, clustered at the ward
level, are shown in parentheses. DD coefficient of interest is “IEPxPA.” Panel A-D
change the dependent variables of interest from heavy maintenance count to various
car accident outcomes. Only car crashes from 2009-2017 that occur on Pittsburgh-
owned roads are included in every column.
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Figure C.1: Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) Counties Over Time
Note: This map shows the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) over time (1965-present). Each new color
represents a year when a new county or counties were added to the ARC. The ARC remained relatively consistent
in geography from 1967 until 1990. Throughout the 1990s-2000s, several counties were added, bringing the current
total of ARC counties to 420. West Virginia is the only state with all of its counties in ARC. Figure was created using
QGIS.
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Figure C.2: 1966 ARC Plan for the ADHS
Note: This is a map of the 1966 planned ADHS route. Compared to Figure 3.1, this map was updated to include the
larger extent of the Appalachian region under ARC.
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Figure C.3: Appalachian County Change in Hypertension Mortality Rates: 1968-2017
Panel A: Change in Hypertension Mortality:
1968-1978
Panel B: Change in Hypertension Mortality:
1978-1988
Panel C: Change in Hypertension Mortality:
1988-1998
Panel D: Change in Hypertension Mortality:
1998-2008
Panel E: Change in Hypertension Mortality:
2008-2017
Note: Appalachian county changes in hypertension mortality rates are shown above. Darker shades of blue represent
negative changes (improved mortality over the decade), while darker shades of orange represent positive changes
(worse mortality over the decade). White counties represent no significant change. Counties grouped into equal
quantiles per decade. County of death mapped.
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Figure C.4: Appalachian County Change in Cerebrovascular Disease Mortality Rates: 1968-2017
Panel A: Change in Cerebrovascular Disease
Mortality: 1968-1978
Panel B: Change in Cerebrovascular Disease
Mortality: 1978-1988
Panel C: Change in Cerebrovascular Disease
Mortality: 1988-1998
Panel D: Change in Cerebrovascular Disease
Mortality: 1998-2008
Panel E: Change in Cerebrovascular Disease
Mortality: 2008-2017
Note: Appalachian county changes in cerebrovascular disease mortality rates are shown above. Darker shades of blue
represent negative changes (improved mortality over the decade), while darker shades of orange represent positive
changes (worse mortality over the decade). White counties represent no significant change. Counties grouped into
equal quantiles per decade. County of death mapped.
144
Figure C.5: Appalachian County Change in Aortic Aneurysm Mortality Rates: 1968-2017
Panel A: Change in Aortic Aneurysm Mortality:
1968-1978
Panel B: Change in Aortic Aneurysm Mortality:
1978-1988
Panel C: Change in Aortic Aneurysm Mortality:
1988-1998
Panel D: Change in Aortic Aneurysm Mortality:
1998-2008
Panel E: Change in Aortic Aneurysm Mortality:
2008-2017
Note: Appalachian county changes in aortic aneurysm mortality rates are shown above. Darker shades of blue repre-
sent negative changes (improved mortality over the decade), while darker shades of orange represent positive changes
(worse mortality over the decade). White counties represent no significant change. Counties grouped into equal
quantiles per decade. County of death mapped.
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Figure C.6: Appalachian County Change in Pneumonia and Influenza Mortality Rates: 1968-2017
Panel A: Change in Pneumonia and Influenza
Mortality: 1968-1978
Panel B: Change in Pneumonia and Influenza
Mortality: 1978-1988
Panel C: Change in Pneumonia and Influenza
Mortality: 1988-1998
Panel D: Change in Pneumonia and Influenza
Mortality: 1998-2008
Panel E: Change in Pneumonia and Influenza
Mortality: 2008-2017
Note: Appalachian county changes in pneumonia and influenza mortality rates are shown above. Darker shades of
blue represent negative changes (improved mortality over the decade), while darker shades of orange represent positive
changes (worse mortality over the decade). White counties represent no significant change. Counties grouped into
equal quantiles per decade. County of death mapped.
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Figure C.7: Hospitals in Appalachia in 2020
Note: Map displays the current ARC region and the hospitals currently open (as of December 2020). A blue dot
represents one open hospital. The orange dots show the county centroids. There are currently 643 open hospitals in
the ARC region. Figure created using QGIS.
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Figure C.8: Existing Road Network: 1960
Note: Map displays the 1960 road network in the Appalachian region. This includes interstates, U.S. routes, and state
routes. Data sourced from Jaworski and Kitchens (2019). Figure created using QGIS.
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Figure C.9: Appalachian Population: 1970-2014
Note: Graph displays Appalachian population in millions from 1970-2014. Estimates of county-level intercensal
populations from 1970-2014 are available from Roth (2016).
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Table C.1: ICD Code Definitions and Changes
Cause of Death ICD-8 (1968-1978) ICD-9 (1979-1998) ICD-10 (1999-present)
Diseases of the Heart 390-398, 402, 404, 410, 429390-398, 402, 404, 410-429I00-I09, I11, I13, I20-I51
Hypertension without
Heart Disease 400-401, 403 401, 403 I10-I12
Cerebrovascular
Diseases 430-438 430- 438 I60-I69
Aortic Aneurysm 441 441 I71
Pneumonia and Influenza 470-474, 480-486 480-487 J09-J18
Complications of Pregnancy,
Childbirth, Puerperium 630-678 630-676 A34, O00-O95, O98-O99
Accidents and Adverse Effects E800-949 800-949 V01-X59, Y85-Y86
Car Accidents E810-E823 E810-E823 V40-V89
Overdoses E850-E859 E850-E859 X40-X44
Note: International Classification of Diseases (ICD) code changes throughout the length of the sample are shown
above. The ICD codes used here arguably not exhaustive, but chosen to increase comparability across time.
Overdoses – “accidental poisoning by drug and/or medicinal substance” – includes only overdoses classified as
a non-intentional death. Online sources include: ICD-8 – http://www.wolfbane.com/icd/icd8.htm;
ICD-9 – http://www.icd9data.com/; ICD-10 – http://www.icd10data.com/
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Table C.2: ARC Investment Projects: 1968-2016
Count of ProjectsPercent of Projects
Asset-Based Development 180 0.60
Business Development 3,452 11.46
Child Development 2,133 7.08
Civic Entrepreneurship 107 0.36
Community Development 5,900 19.59
Education & Workforce Development 486 1.61
Education and Job Training 4,509 14.98
Environment and Natural Resources 431 1.43
Health 4,179 13.88
Highways & Access Roads 1,093 3.63
Housing 1,216 4.04
Leadership and Civic Capacity 704 2.34
Local Development Distric Planning & Admin. 3,676 12.21
Research & Evaluation 44 0.15
Research and Technical Assistance 1,488 4.94
State & LDD Administration 512 1.70
Total 30,110 100.00
Notes: Table displays types of ARC-funded investment projects from 1968-2016.
C.1 Other Mortality Outcomes
Cerebrovascular Disease – Table C.1.1 display the 2SLS results for cerebrovascular disease
mortality rates. In all decades considered, the second stage relationship is never significant.
Aortic Aneurysm – Table C.1.2 shows, similar to cerebrovascular disease, the second stage
relationship is never statistically significant. This could be due to the relatively small mortality
rate for aortic aneurysm in the Appalachian region, as shown in Figure 3.3e.
Pneumonia and Influenza – Table C.1.3 shows a non-significant relationship between ADHS
construction and pneumonia and influenza mortality rates in Appalachia.
Complications with Pregnancy – Table C.1.4 shows, again, no significant relationship between
ADHS construction and mortality rates from complications with pregnancy. Again, this could be
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due to the relatively small amount of recorded complications with pregnancy in Appalachia; this
is shown in Figure 3.3g.
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Table C.1.1: 2SLS Estimates of Appalachian Development Highway System on Cerebrovascular
Disease Mortality Rate With Controls
(1) (2) (3)
Reduced Form 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Panel A: 1968-1978
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.003 -0.197***
(0.094) (0.023)̂∆ADHS 0.015
(0.474)
Counties 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 74.05
Panel B: 1978-1988
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.041 -0.100***
(0.038) (0.010)̂∆ADHS 0.407
(0.383)
Counties 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 95.95
Panel C: 1988-1998
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.041 -0.034***
(0.031) (0.009)̂∆ADHS 1.194
(1.041)
Counties 406 406 406
Kleibergen-Paap F 14.12
Panel D: 1998-2008
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.021 -0.040***
(0.026) (0.010)̂∆ADHS 0.509
(0.677)
Counties 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 13.91
Panel E: 2008-2017
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.009 -0.003***
(0.020) (0.001)̂∆ADHS 2.971
(6.252)
Counties 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 9.08
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent variable is change in cerebrovascular
disease mortality in Appalachia. Each panel, A-E, shows the results for a different time period.
Column 1 shows reduced form results (PARC distance on mortality), Column 2 shows first
stage results (PARC distance on ADHS distance), and Column 3 shows second stage results
(instrumented ADHS distance on mortality). Controls included in every panel are the count
of hospital establishments in the last year of the decade and the total number of health-related
ARC investment projects over the decade at the county level. County-clustered standard errors
are used in every column and panel. 153
Table C.1.2: 2SLS Estimates of Appalachian Development Highway System on Aortic Aneurysm
Mortality Rate With Controls
(1) (2) (3)
Reduced Form 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Panel A: 1968-1978
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan 0.007 -0.197***
(0.012) (0.023)̂∆ADHS -0.034
(0.062)
Counties 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 74.05
Panel B: 1978-1988
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.004 -0.100***
(0.009) (0.010)̂∆ADHS 0.044
(0.088)
Counties 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 95.95
Panel C: 1988-1998
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.004 -0.034***
(0.006) (0.009)̂∆ADHS 0.118
(0.180)
Counties 406 406 406
Kleibergen-Paap F 14.12
Panel D: 1998-2008
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan 0.009 -0.040***
(0.006) (0.010)̂∆ADHS -0.214
(0.172)
Counties 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 13.91
Panel E: 2008-2017
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan 0.000 -0.003***
(0.007) (0.001)̂∆ADHS -0.088
(2.157)
Counties 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 9.08
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent variable is change in aortic aneurysm
mortality in Appalachia. Each panel, A-E, shows the results for a different time period. Col-
umn 1 shows reduced form results (PARC distance on mortality), Column 2 shows first stage
results (PARC distance on ADHS distance), and Column 3 shows second stage results (in-
strumented ADHS distance on mortality). Controls included in every panel are the count of
hospital establishments in the last year of the decade and the total number of health-related
ARC investment projects over the decade at the county level. County-clustered standard errors
are used in every column and panel. 154
Table C.1.3: 2SLS Estimates of Appalachian Development Highway System on Pneumonia and
Influenza Mortality Rate With Controls
(1) (2) (3)
Reduced Form 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Panel A: 1968-1978
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan 0.031 -0.197***
(0.054) (0.023)̂∆ADHS -0.159
(0.273)
Counties 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 74.05
Panel B: 1978-1988
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.013 -0.100***
(0.020) (0.010)̂∆ADHS 0.126
(0.200)
Counties 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 95.95
Panel C: 1988-1998
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.013 -0.034***
(0.019) (0.009)̂∆ADHS 0.376
(0.563)
Counties 406 406 406
Kleibergen-Paap F 14.12
Panel D: 1998-2008
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan 0.019 -0.040***
(0.023) (0.010)̂∆ADHS -0.465
(0.592)
Counties 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 13.91
Panel E: 2008-2017
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.003 -0.003***
(0.018) (0.001)̂∆ADHS 1.032
(5.740)
Counties 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 9.08
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent variable is change in pneumonia and
influenza mortality in Appalachia. Each panel, A-E, shows the results for a different time
period. Column 1 shows reduced form results (PARC distance on mortality), Column 2 shows
first stage results (PARC distance on ADHS distance), and Column 3 shows second stage
results (instrumented ADHS distance on mortality). Controls included in every panel are the
count of hospital establishments in the last year of the decade and the total number of health-
related ARC investment projects over the decade at the county level. County-clustered standard
errors are used in every column and panel. 155
C.2 IV Results without Controls
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Table C.1.4: 2SLS Estimates of Appalachian Development Highway System on Complications
with Pregnancy Mortality Rate With Controls
(1) (2) (3)
Reduced Form 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Panel A: 1968-1978
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan 0.002 -0.197***
(0.002) (0.023)̂∆ADHS -0.012
(0.010)
Counties 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 74.05
Panel B: 1978-1988
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan 0.000 -0.100***
(0.001) (0.010)̂∆ADHS -0.004
(0.013)
Counties 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 95.95
Panel C: 1988-1998
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.001 -0.034***
(0.001) (0.009)̂∆ADHS 0.020
(0.033)
Counties 406 406 406
Kleibergen-Paap F 14.12
Panel D: 1998-2008
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan 0.001 -0.040***
(0.001) (0.010)̂∆ADHS -0.024
(0.027)
Counties 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 13.91
Panel E: 2008-2017
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.002 -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)̂∆ADHS 0.549
(0.605)
Counties 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 9.08
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent variable is change in complications
with pregnancy mortality in Appalachia. Each panel, A-E, shows the results for a different
time period. Column 1 shows reduced form results (PARC distance on mortality), Column
2 shows first stage results (PARC distance on ADHS distance), and Column 3 shows second
stage results (instrumented ADHS distance on mortality). Controls included in every panel
are the count of hospital establishments in the last year of the decade and the total number of
health-related ARC investment projects over the decade at the county level. County-clustered
standard errors are used in every column and panel.157
Table C.2.1: 2SLS Estimates of Appalachian Development Highway System on Total Mortality
Rate Without Controls
(1) (2) (3)
Reduced Form 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Panel A: 1968-1978
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan 0.319 -0.198***
(0.740) (0.023)̂∆ADHS -1.611
(3.742)
Counties 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 73.45
Panel B: 1978-1988
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan 0.171 -0.099***
(0.291) (0.010)̂∆ADHS -1.725
(2.940)
Counties 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 93.82
Panel C: 1988-1998
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.256* -0.034***
(0.141) (0.009)̂∆ADHS 7.437*
(4.448)
Counties 406 406 406
Kleibergen-Paap F 14.80
Panel D: 1998-2008
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan 0.129 -0.040***
(0.151) (0.011)̂∆ADHS -3.202
(3.867)
Counties 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 13.77
Panel E: 2008-2017
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.381** -0.003***
(0.164) (0.001)̂∆ADHS 114.696*
(61.145)
Counties 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 9.06
Two-Step AR-CIs [23.9062, 362.855]
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent variable is change in total mortality in Appalachia.
Each panel, A-E, shows the results for a different time period. Column 1 shows reduced form results
(PARC distance on mortality), Column 2 shows first stage results (PARC distance on ADHS distance),
and Column 3 shows second stage results (instrumented ADHS distance on mortality). County-clustered
standard errors are used in every column and panel. Panel E includes two-step Anderson-Rubin confi-
dence interval.
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Table C.2.2: 2SLS Estimates of Appalachian Development Highway System on Heart Disease
Mortality Rate Without Controls
(1) (2) (3)
Reduced Form 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Panel A: 1968-1978
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.079 -0.198***
(0.166) (0.023)̂∆ADHS 0.398
(0.837)
Counties 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 73.45
Panel B: 1978-1988
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan 0.291** -0.099***
(0.134) (0.010)̂∆ADHS -2.934**
(1.417)
Counties 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 93.82
Panel C: 1988-1998
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.021 -0.034***
(0.067) (0.009)̂∆ADHS 0.607
(1.900)
Counties 406 406 406
Kleibergen-Paap F 14.80
Panel D: 1998-2008
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan 0.193 -0.040***
(0.071) (0.011)̂∆ADHS -4.797**
(2.158)
Counties 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 13.77
Panel E: 2008-2017
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.102 -0.003***
(0.062) (0.001)̂∆ADHS 30.663
(21.835)
Counties 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 9.06
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent variable is change in heart disease mor-
tality in Appalachia. Each panel, A-E, shows the results for a different time period. Column 1
shows reduced form results (PARC distance on mortality), Column 2 shows first stage results
(PARC distance on ADHS distance), and Column 3 shows second stage results (instrumented
ADHS distance on mortality). County-clustered standard errors are used in every column and
panel.
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Table C.2.3: 2SLS Estimates of Appalachian Development Highway System on Hypertension
Mortality Rate Without Controls
(1) (2) (3)
Reduced Form 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Panel A: 1968-1978
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.006 -0.198***
(0.012) (0.023)̂∆ADHS 0.028
(0.059)
Counties 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 73.45
Panel B: 1978-1988
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.000 -0.099***
(0.003) (0.010)̂∆ADHS 0.000
(0.003)
Counties 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 93.82
Panel C: 1988-1998
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan 0.017** -0.034***
(0.007) (0.009)̂∆ADHS -0.503**
(0.217)
Counties 406 406 406
Kleibergen-Paap F 14.80
Panel D: 1998-2008
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.001 -0.040***
(0.014) (0.011)̂∆ADHS 0.013
(0.358)
Counties 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 13.77
Panel E: 2008-2017
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.015 -0.003***
(0.014) (0.001)̂∆ADHS 4.531
(4.421)
Counties 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 9.06
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent variable is change in hypertension mor-
tality in Appalachia. Each panel, A-E, shows the results for a different time period. Column 1
shows reduced form results (PARC distance on mortality), Column 2 shows first stage results
(PARC distance on ADHS distance), and Column 3 shows second stage results (instrumented
ADHS distance on mortality). County-clustered standard errors are used in every column and
panel.
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Table C.2.4: 2SLS Estimates of Appalachian Development Highway System on Cerebrovascular
Disease Mortality Rate Without Controls
(1) (2) (3)
Reduced Form 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Panel A: 1968-1978
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.006 -0.198***
(0.093) (0.023)
∆ in Cerebrovascular Disease Mortality 0.032
(0.469)
Counties 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 73.45
Panel B: 1978-1988
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.037 -0.099***
(0.038) (0.010)̂∆ADHS 0.368
(0.390)
Counties 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 93.82
Panel C: 1988-1998
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.035 -0.034***
(0.031) (0.009)̂∆ADHS 1.016
(0.991)
Counties 406 406 406
Kleibergen-Paap F 14.80
Panel D: 1998-2008
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.020 -0.040***
(0.026) (0.011)̂∆ADHS 0.490
(0.671)
Counties 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 13.77
Panel E: 2008-2017
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.010 -0.003***
(0.020) (0.001)̂∆ADHS 3.009
(6.086)
Counties 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 9.06
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent variable is change in cerebrovascular disease
mortality in Appalachia. Each panel, A-E, shows the results for a different time period. Column 1 shows
reduced form results (PARC distance on mortality), Column 2 shows first stage results (PARC distance on
ADHS distance), and Column 3 shows second stage results (instrumented ADHS distance on mortality).
County-clustered standard errors are used in every column and panel.
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Table C.2.5: 2SLS Estimates of Appalachian Development Highway System on Aortic Aneurysm
Mortality Rate Without Controls
(1) (2) (3)
Reduced Form 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Panel A: 1968-1978
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan 0.007 -0.198***
(0.012) (0.023)̂∆ADHS -0.034
(0.062)
Counties 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 73.45
Panel B: 1978-1988
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.004 -0.099***
(0.009) (0.010)̂∆ADHS 0.044
(0.089)
Counties 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 93.82
Panel C: 1988-1998
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.004 -0.034***
(0.006) (0.009)̂∆ADHS 0.114
(0.176)
Counties 406 406 406
Kleibergen-Paap F 14.80
Panel D: 1998-2008
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan 0.009 -0.040***
(0.006) (0.011)̂∆ADHS -0.220
(0.176)
Counties 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 13.77
Panel E: 2008-2017
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.000 -0.003***
(0.007) (0.001)̂∆ADHS 0.027
(2.045)
Counties 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 9.06
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent variable is change in aortic aneurysm
mortality in Appalachia. Each panel, A-E, shows the results for a different time period. Col-
umn 1 shows reduced form results (PARC distance on mortality), Column 2 shows first stage
results (PARC distance on ADHS distance), and Column 3 shows second stage results (in-
strumented ADHS distance on mortality). County-clustered standard errors are used in every
column and panel.
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Table C.2.6: 2SLS Estimates of Appalachian Development Highway System on Pneumonia and
Influenza Mortality Rate Without Controls
(1) (2) (3)
Reduced Form 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Panel A: 1968-1978
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan 0.030 -0.198***
(0.053) (0.023)̂∆ADHS -0.153
(0.270)
Counties 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 73.45
Panel B: 1978-1988
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.014 -0.099***
(0.020) (0.010)̂∆ADHS 0.142
(0.198)
Counties 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 93.82
Panel C: 1988-1998
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.006 -0.034***
(0.019) (0.009)̂∆ADHS 0.181
(0.551)
Counties 406 406 406
Kleibergen-Paap F 14.80
Panel D: 1998-2008
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan 0.019 -0.040***
(0.023) (0.011)̂∆ADHS -0.481
(0.610)
Counties 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 13.77
Panel E: 2008-2017
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.004 -0.003***
(0.018) (0.001)̂∆ADHS 1.138
(5.536)
Counties 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 9.06
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent variable is change in pneumonia and
influenza mortality in Appalachia. Each panel, A-E, shows the results for a different time
period. Column 1 shows reduced form results (PARC distance on mortality), Column 2 shows
first stage results (PARC distance on ADHS distance), and Column 3 shows second stage
results (instrumented ADHS distance on mortality). County-clustered standard errors are used
in every column and panel.
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Table C.2.7: 2SLS Estimates of Appalachian Development Highway System on Complications
with Pregnancy Mortality Rate Without Controls
(1) (2) (3)
Reduced Form 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Panel A: 1968-1978
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan 0.002 -0.198***
(0.002) (0.023)̂∆ADHS -0.01
(0.010)
Counties 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 73.45
Panel B: 1978-1988
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan 0.000 -0.099***
(0.001) (0.010)̂∆ADHS -0.004
(0.013)
Counties 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 93.82
Panel C: 1988-1998
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.001 -0.034***
(0.001) (0.009)̂∆ADHS 0.017
(0.032)
Counties 406 406 406
Kleibergen-Paap F 14.80
Panel D: 1998-2008
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan 0.001 -0.040***
(0.001) (0.011)̂∆ADHS -0.027
(0.027)
Counties 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 13.77
Panel E: 2008-2017
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.002 -0.003***
(0.002) (0.001)̂∆ADHS 0.492
(0.489)
Counties 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 9.06
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent variable is change in complications
with pregnancy mortality in Appalachia. Each panel, A-E, shows the results for a different
time period. Column 1 shows reduced form results (PARC distance on mortality), Column
2 shows first stage results (PARC distance on ADHS distance), and Column 3 shows second
stage results (instrumented ADHS distance on mortality). County-clustered standard errors are
used in every column and panel.
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Table C.2.8: 2SLS Estimates of Appalachian Development Highway System on Accident
Mortality Rate Without Controls
(1) (2) (3)
Reduced Form 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Panel A: 1968-1978
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.006 -0.198***
(0.040) (0.023)̂∆ADHS 0.031
(0.201)
Counties 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 73.45
Panel B: 1978-1988
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan 0.070 -0.099***
(0.052) (0.010)̂∆ADHS -0.700
(0.530)
Counties 396 396 396
Kleibergen-Paap F 93.82
Panel C: 1988-1998
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.034 -0.034***
(0.029) (0.009)̂∆ADHS 0.973
(0.837)
Counties 406 406 406
Kleibergen-Paap F 14.80
Panel D: 1998-2008
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.065** -0.040***
(0.021) (0.011)̂∆ADHS 1.618**
(0.719)
Counties 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 13.77
Panel E: 2008-2017
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.099*** -0.003***
(0.023) (0.001)̂∆ADHS 29.763**
(11.742)
Counties 427 427 427
Kleibergen-Paap F 9.06
Two-Step AR-CIs [14.6531, 86.716]
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent variable is change in accident mortality in Ap-
palachia. Each panel, A-E, shows the results for a different time period. Column 1 shows reduced
form results (PARC distance on mortality), Column 2 shows first stage results (PARC distance on
ADHS distance), and Column 3 shows second stage results (instrumented ADHS distance on mortal-
ity). County-clustered standard errors are used in every column and panel. Panel E includes two-step
Anderson-Rubin confidence interval.
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C.3 Cumulative Effect of the ADHS on Mortality
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Table C.3.1: Panel 2SLS Estimates of Appalachian Development Highway System on Mortality
Rate With Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mortality Mean Reduced Form 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Panel A: Total Mortality
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.001* 0.000***
(0.709) (0.000)̂ADHS 853.892 -2.480*
(491.219) (1.468)
Observations 19183 19183 19183 19183
Kleibergen-Paap F 130.99
Panel B: Heart Disease Mortality
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.000* 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)̂ADHS 294.620 -0.772*
(164.465) (0.449)
Observations 19183 19183 19183 19183
Kleibergen-Paap F 131.22
Panel C: Hypertension Mortality
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.000 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)̂ADHS 8.220 0.006
(8.054) (0.015)
Observations 19183 19183 19183 19183
Kleibergen-Paap F 123.22
Panel D: Accident Mortality
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.000** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)̂ADHS 52.565 -0.216*
(37.689) (0.112)
Observations 19183 19183 19183 19183
Kleibergen-Paap F 132.09
Panel E: Overdose Mortality
Distance to PARC 1964 Plan -0.000 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)̂ADHS 40.368 -0.155
(38.811) (0.101)
Observations 19183 19183 19183 19183
Kleibergen-Paap F 145.91
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent variable is mortality rate in Appalachia. Each panel, A-E, shows the
results for a different mortality outcome. Column 1 shows the mean mortality rate, with standard deviations in parentheses.
Column 2 shows reduced form results (PARC distance on mortality), Column 3 shows first stage results (PARC distance on
ADHS distance), and Column 4 shows second stage results (instrumented ADHS distance on mortality). Controls included
in every panel are the count of hospital establishments in the last year of the decade, the total number of health-related ARC
investment projects over the decade at the county level, and the length of existing road network in 1960 at the county level.
Year and state fixed effects are used in every panel. County-clustered standard errors are used in every panel.
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